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John G. Roberts, Jr. has now served more than five years as the seventeenth Chief Justice
of the United States. He has held that position longer than Harlan Fiske Stone did and for nearly
twice as many days as John F. Kennedy was President.
Although Roberts’ judicial opinions, and those of the Court, offer jurisprudence to
analyze, it is too early to reach definitive judgments regarding Roberts’ influence as Chief
Justice or his success in that position. Roberts holds an office that, unique among high
governmental positions, resists confident real-time assessment.
The office of Chief Justice is cloaked in ambiguity and mystery. Most of what the Chief
does publicly either resembles the work of the Associate Justices (i.e., opinion writing), involves
administration of the federal judiciary, or seems ceremonial. The Chief’s administrative work
may contribute importantly to the functioning of the judiciary,1 yet these labors do not provide
1

For instance, William Howard Taft was instrumental in securing passage of the Judges Act of

1925, which made most of the Court’s docket discretionary. Henry J. Abraham, Justices,
Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S. Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to
Bush II 238–239 (5th ed., Rowan & Littlefield 2008) (describing Warren Burger’s administrative
achievements); Earl M. Maltz, The Chief Justiceship of Warren Burger, 1969–1986, 10–11 (U.
S.C. Press 2000) (also describing the administrative achievements of Warren Burger); Sandra
Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice 141–145
(Random House 2003) (discussing the initial skepticism that greeted Burger’s administrative
reforms); Robert J. Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court 184–185, 187–
192 (U. S.C. Press 1986) (discussing the administrative reforms of Chief Justice Burger); see
generally Alan B. Morrison & D. Scott Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of the United States: More
Than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, 1 Const. Commentary 57 (1994) (discussing the
1

the usual measure for assessing his contributions. Instead, history typically evaluates Chief
Justices based largely on their perceived impact on the Court’s institutional standing and on its
decisions and opinions, particularly those regarding constitutional interpretation. Yet measuring
that influence is difficult.
The formal powers of the Chief Justice regarding the Court’s work are few—presiding at
conference and assigning opinions when in the majority—and the linkage between a Chief’s
action and historic effect is often inscrutable. Most of that activity which may significantly and
distinctively affect the Court’s work occurs behind closed doors, obscured from the view of all
but a few observers. Those who witness it, primarily the other Justices, generally maintain a
discrete silence, at least while the Chief presides, other than tossing occasional public praise his
way.
The necessary customs of a small, collegial judicial institution may mandate these
characteristics of invisible interactions and contemporary confidentiality but those habits
postpone informed judgment by denying outside observers critical information. Though these
attributes characterize the Supreme Court generally, the Roberts Court presents some additional
impediments to assessment. It has experienced a high degree of turnover with four new
members, including the Chief, in five years.2 That amount of transition in personnel imposes new
challenges for many members, including the Chief. New members must become acclimated to
nonjudicial responsibilities of Chief Justice); Steamer, supra n. 1, at 16 (arguing that Taft’s term
saw the Chief Justice become the head of the judiciary rather than simply the presiding officer of
the Court.
2

S. Ct. of the U.S., Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,

http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (accessed Jan. 26, 2011).
2

the Court’s work, practices, and personalities; continuing Justices must familiarize themselves
with colleagues who have different attitudes, experiences, and styles than their predecessors.
The new members include a new Chief Justice who many had previously experienced as an
advocate or lower court judge. The retirements of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, David Souter,
and John Paul Stevens necessarily impacted the group dynamic by removing some powerful
personalities from the institutional mix. Turnover also puts some members in new roles. Anthony
Kennedy now is senior to all but the Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia. Stevens’ retirement means
that Kennedy gets to assign the opinion when he joins the four “liberal” Justices. These changes
mark the Court as an institution currently in flux. Some time is needed before the Justices adjust
to a changed context and before the component parts arrange themselves in discernible and
predictable patterns.
Moreover, Roberts’ youth when appointed—he was fifty—raises the prospect that these
first five years may be but a fragment of a tenure which could rival in length John Marshall’s
thirty-four year run. Even if Roberts does not match that record, life tenure and the actuarial
tables would predict that his service will substantially exceed the seventeen-year average of his
three most recent predecessors.3 Thus, Roberts may still be in the early moments of his tenure, a
possibility that carries two significant consequences which, taken together, present a historical
dilemma. The likely longevity of his term may allow him to exert a relatively unique impact on
the Court and on American law. Nonetheless, much information regarding his leadership may
remain hidden for some time, until his colleagues are willing to speak frankly and until his
papers and those of other Justices are made available for scholars to assess. The history of his

3

Id.
3

Chief Justiceship is being made, yet the history of his leadership will not be heard,4 at least for a
while.
Even though circumstances will defer informed assessments of Roberts’ impact, the
patterns of the recent past may provide some useful analytical tools to help anticipate the
likelihood that Roberts will exert influence as Chief Justice and the ways he might do so.
Although the Chief Justice has “scant inherent powers”5 and some suggest his office carries “no
more authority than other members of the [C]ourt,”6 anecdotal evidence suggests that a Chief can
make a substantial difference, in discrete cases and in the overall operation of the Court.7
Historically, informed governmental observers have cared deeply who becomes Chief Justice,
and their behavior provides some evidence that the office is consequential.8
4

Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 705 (2007)

(Roberts himself wrote “but when it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history
will be heard.”)
5

Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 192 (Simon & Schuster 1964).

6

Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 246 (Oxford U. Press 1993). See also Felix

Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 Va. L. Rev. 883, 901 (1953) (Stating that “[a]side
from the power to assign the writing of opinions . . . a Chief Justice has no authority that any
other member of the Court has[ no]t” and that the Court, was really “an institution in which
every man is his own sovereign. The Chief Justice is primus inter pares.”)
7

Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 899–902.

8

When Chief Justice Fuller died on July 4, 1910, several members of the Court wanted to

succeed him and significant lobbying occurred before President Taft nominated Justice Edward
White. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 133–134. When White died on May 19, 1921, Taft became Chief
4

Some consensus suggests that during the last century there have been at least two great
Chiefs— Charles Evans Hughes and Earl Warren9—although some would add a third, William
Justice. Id. at 135. This was after making clear that he would not accept appointment as an
Associate Justice and after having previously declined such appointments. Mason, supra n. 5, at
17. When Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22, 1946, some Justices reportedly sent
word to President Truman that they would resign if Justice Robert Jackson became Chief Justice.
When Truman instead nominated Fred Vinson, Jackson sent an unprecedented cable to two
Congressional committee chairs blasting Justice Hugo Black who he suspected of undermining
his prospects for elevation. Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Black v. Jackson: A Study in Judicial Enmity, in
The Unmaking of a Whig 3, 42–49 (Geo. U. Press 1990). Presidents care, too. Taft stewed over
the appointment in 1910, as did Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, and Truman in 1946. Lyndon B.
Johnson so wanted to elevate his friend, Justice Abe Fortas, that he ignored warning signs that
such an appointment would receive a hostile reception. And senators place great stock in who
occupies the center chair. Republicans and Southern Democrats invested considerable energies in
successfully filibustering Fortas’s promotion even though it would not change the Court’s
composition. When Ronald Reagan nominated Justice William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice,
Senate Democrats focused on contesting his nomination but essentially ignored that of Judge
Antonin Scalia who Reagan had nominated for Rehnquist’s seat even though Rehnquist’s
elevation would not change the composition of the Court, whereas Scalia’s confirmation would.
9

See Steamer, supra n. 1, at 36 (identifying Hughes and Warren, along with John Marshall, as

great Chief Justices); Abe Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The Enigma of Leadership, 84 Yale L.J.
405, 405–406 (1975) (describing Marshall and Hughes’ leadership as “outstanding” and stating
that Warren should be included in that “special category”).
5

Howard Taft.10 At least three others—Harlan Fiske Stone, Fred Vinson, and Warren Burger—
are regarded as pretty unsuccessful measured by their leadership of the Court’s decisionmaking
efforts.11
The modest, some might say meager, formal powers of a Chief Justice may allow, but
certainly do not guarantee, judicial leadership.12 Whether a Chief leads, and leads well, depends
on his capacity to exploit the opportunities the powers provide. This ability turns on his
possession of intangible qualities, which are unevenly distributed among those who occupy the
center chair. Between his two stints on the Court (at a time when he presumably thought his
chance to be Chief Justice had passed), Hughes wrote that the Chief’s “actual influence will
depend upon the strength of his character and the demonstration of his ability in the intimate

10

Abraham, supra n. 1, at 5–7, 158, 203; see id. at 147 (arguing that Taft was not a great Chief

Justice despite his administrative and technical leadership); Mason, supra n. 5, at 304 (observing
that Taft was not commonly regarded as a great Chief Justice).
11

Maltz, supra n. 1, at 11 (arguing that Burger was not a distinguished Chief Justice based on his

role in jurisprudential leadership); Alpheus T. Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States:
Primus Inter Pares, 17 J. Pub. L. 20 (1968) (stating that Stone “suffered from administrative
ineptitude”); see generally Abraham, supra n. 1, at 183–184, 191, 238–240 (discussing Stone’s
“less [than] satisfactory” role as Chief Justice, Vinson’s “lack of leadership,” and Burger’s
“marginally successful attempts” to shift the judicial position).
12

David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in Walter F.

Murphy et al., Courts, Judges, & Politics 675, 676 (6th ed., McGraw-Hill 2006) (stating that the
office of Chief Justice “does not guarantee leadership”).
6

relations of the judges.”13 Professor David Danelski essentially echoed this conclusion in an
important article a half century ago; he concluded that a Chief Justice’s “actual influence
depends upon his esteem, ability, and personality and how he performs his various roles.”14
This Hughes-Danelski assessment seems clearly correct. Yet the experiences of Chief
Justices during the last century suggest two refinements. First, there is no one model of
background or conduct that predictsgreatness as a Chief Justice. The traits that seem to correlate
well with success as Chief Justice are intangible qualities of leadership, not any characteristics
that lend themselves to easy measurement. Second, the influence of a Chief Justice inevitably
depends on contextual factors as well as on personal attributes. Whether a Chief Justice can lead,
and how, depends on the opportunities history provides, and those vary from Chief to Chief and
often during any one incumbency.
Part I of this Article will outline the thesis of Danelski’s 1960 article and apply it to the
seven Chief Justices from Taft to Rehnquist. Relying on these sketches, Part II will discuss the
impact of context on the Chief’s influence. Part III will suggest that tangible qualities and
particular practices do not correlate well with success as Chief Justice. Part IV will apply some
of these generalizations to Roberts before Part V offers conclusions.
I.

The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process
A. The Danelski Formulation

Fifty years ago, David J. Danelski published a short study of the Chief Justice’s influence
in the Court’s decisionmaking process based on his review of Court papers during the Taft,
13

Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 57 (Garden City Publg. Co.

1928).
14

Danelski, supra n. 12, at 676.
7

Hughes, and Stone chief justiceships. He identified task and social leadership as two distinct
activities that contributed to the success and cohesion of the Court.15 The former role focused on
the Court’s work to reach a decision whereas the latter emphasized the need of the members of
the institution to remain sufficiently cohesive, socially, to accomplish its work. The Chief’s
success in performing those roles is not assured but is contingent on his or her mix of skills as
perceived by his or her colleagues, “his [or her] esteem, ability, and personality and how he [or
she] performs his [or her] roles.”16
Danelski suggested that the Chief Justice, as the presiding officer at the conference, was
in a favorable but not inevitable position to exert “both task and social leadership.”17 The Chief
Justice typically presented the cases to the conference, which Danelski regarded as “an important
task function.”18 Although Danelski did not spell out the advantages associated with case
presentation, presumably that function allows the Chief to frame the issues, a prerogative that
may effectively steer discussion in a particular direction. Moreover, the right to be the first to
state a position affords the Chief the opportunity to suggest a resolution before anyone else has
verbally committed. Thus, presumably, the order of speaking at conference gives the Chief
persuading advantages over those who only get to weigh in after others have already stated their
views. Minds can and do change but most are more persuadable before, not after, they have
shared a conclusion. Finally, the assignment power that the Chief exercises when in the majority
confers substantial opportunity to shape the doctrine that will emerge from the decision.
15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.
8

Danelski pointed out that presiding at conference also positioned the Chief to exercise
critical social functions. He was in position “to invite suggestions and opinions, seek
compromises, and cut off debate which appears to be getting out of hand.”19 His ability to engage
his colleagues yet manage their interaction could contribute to the Court’s cohesion, or lack
thereof.
Danelski also explored the importance of the opinion assigning role, which falls to the
Chief when he is part of the majority. That function presented four instrumental challenges:
producing a valuable precedent, winning public acceptance for a decision, preserving a majority
when the Court was divided, and massing the Court.
Finally, Danelski concluded that unifying the Court was among the Chief’s “most
important roles.”20 Quite clearly, the Chief’s skill as a task and social leader and in assigning
opinions would contribute to his success in this role. So, too, would the extent to which he
emphasized unanimity as a judicial norm.
B. Successful Chief Justices
1. Charles Evans Hughes
Hughes’ great success as Chief Justice related in part to his ability to merge the roles of
task and social leader. Danelski proclaimed Hughes “the most esteemed member of his Court” in
large part due to his commanding performance at conference.21 Hughes’ work won the respect of
his colleagues. “Few men have been so fitted by talent and disposition to carry the heavy burden

19

Id.

20

Id. at 681.

21

Id. at 677.
9

which unavoidably rests on the Chief Justice,” wrote Stone.22 “He was master of the business,”
said Frankfurter,23 who likened Hughes presiding to Toscanini conducting.24
The Chief Justice’s case-stating prerogative probably contributed to Hughes’ influence
even more than it enhanced that of his predecessors or successors. By all accounts, Hughes was
an outstanding lawyer with a keen analytical mind and a formidable memory. He labored over
case files until he had mastered them. At conference, he stated cases succinctly yet
comprehensively, precisely, and impartially.25 The case having been presented, he concluded by
22

Harlan F. Stone, The Chief Justice, 27 ABA. J. 407 (July 1941).

23

Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 901.

24

Id. See also Felix Frankfurter, “The Administrative Side” of Chief Justice Hughes, 63 Harv. L.

Rev. 1, 3 (1949)(“He knew that the manner of conducting the business of the Court affects the
matter….In Court and in conference, he struck the pitch, as it were, for the orchestra.”).
25

Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes 664–665, 673 (Macmillan Co. 1951); Owen J. Roberts,

Charles Evans Hughes: The Administrative Master in Alan F. Westin, An Autobiography of the
Supreme Court 205, 208 (Greenwood Press 1963); Stone, supra n. 22 , at 407 (referring to
Hughes’ “extraordinary power of accurate and luminous statement”); Transcriptions of
Conversations Between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette
No. 1: December 20, 1961, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas1
.html (accessed Jan. 24, 2011) (“Hughes covered all those in a very, very efficient way. One of
the reasons that he did that was, first, he had tremendous capacity, an unusual capacity to get
things done very fast.”); Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by
Chief Justice Hughes, 63Harv. L. Rev. 5, 14-15, 17 (1949) (discussing Hughes’s skill in stating
cases and his elaborate preparation for conference).
10

offering his preferred resolution, and his statements of proposed dispositions often commanded
assent.26 After listening to discussion, Hughes then summarized the Court’s position and reacted
to the comments of the other Justices.27
In addition to Hughes’ task leadership, Danelski regarded him as the social leader of the
Court who acted to ensure its cohesion.28 Hughes was not a backslapping extrovert but
maintained warm relations with his brethren, some of whom he had known for years before
becoming Chief Justice.29 Hughes was sensitive to the personalities and psychic needs of his

26

Roberts, supra n. 25, at 208.

27

Pusey, supra n. 25, at 675; Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 Harv.

L. Rev. 4, 40 (1967).
28

Danelski, supra n. 12, at 677.

29

Hughes had served with Justices Holmes, Van Devanter, and McReynolds during his first stint

on the Court. Charles Evans Hughes, The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes 298
(David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., Harv. U. Press 1973). Hughes maintained warm
relations with them, even with the incorrigible McReynolds, who reportedly deferred to him.
Pusey, supra n. 25, at 667–668, 670–671. Hughes was particularly friendly with Van Devanter
from their prior service. William G. Ross, The Chief Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes,
1930–1941, at 1919 (U. S.C. Press 2007). Hughes and Brandeis had overlapped for only a few
days in June 1916, but they had known each other as practicing lawyers and had a warm
relationship. Hughes, supra n. 29, at 171, 298. Hughes and Cardozo were old friends long before
Hoover nominated Cardozo to succeed Holmes. Id. at 299–300; Pusey, supra n. 25, at 682.
Hughes had served in Herbert Hoover’s Cabinet with Harlan Fiske Stone. Hughes, supra n. 29,
11

colleagues, and he presided with tact. Hughes treated his colleagues in a courteous manner and
did not let jurisprudential disagreements affect his interactions with them.30
Hughes’ command in conference was no doubt enhanced by his behavior towards the
other Justices outside of it. When Justice Van Devanter fell behind in his opinions, Hughes
would sometimes reclaim some assigned cases, but always with the comment that Van Devanter
had been overburdened.31 The anti-Semitic McReynolds avoided social encounters with Louis
Brandeis, so Hughes divided his colleagues between two annual dinners he hosted.32 Hughes
developed and maintained a close rapport with Owen Roberts,33 and when Roberts was
hospitalized for three weeks, Hughes visited him every weekday.34 Knowing that Cardozo would
immediately begin working on an opinion on Saturday night if he received an assignment after
the conference, Hughes withheld Cardozo’s allotment until Sunday or Monday to protect his
health.35 So Cardozo would not feel singled out, Hughes also deferred sending assignments to
Van Devanter, Cardozo’s neighbor.36 He handled the delicate mission of suggesting to Holmes
that it was time for the ninety-year-old to retire with such tact that Holmes immediately took the
at 298. Brandeis and McReynolds, representing opposite wings of the Court, both endorsed
Hughes’s nomination. Ross, supra n. 29, at 19–20.
30

Ross, supra n. 29, at 28, 219.

31

Pusey, supra n. 25, at 667–668.

32

Id. at 670.

33

Hughes, supra n. 29, at 298.

34

Pusey, supra n. 25, at 669.

35

William O. Douglas, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 549, 549 (1960).

36

Pusey, supra n. 25, at 678.
12

hint free of ill feeling.37 Hugo Black had voted against Hughes’ nomination as Chief Justice and
had advocated the court-packing plan; yet, Hughes treated him with such courtesy and respect
that Black became an admirer.38 Hughes never lobbied other Justices outside of the conference
room although he was open to discussing a case if approached.39
Hughes facilitated the Court’s work and generally won points with his colleagues by his
efficient administration. He conducted Court business in a manner that was respectful of his
colleagues’ calendars. Conferences began on schedule, and Hughes enforced the time allotted to
oral advocates (it was said, perhaps apocryphally, that he once cut an advocate off in the middle
of the word “if”) and was not afraid to end oral argument when no longer needed. Hughes
typically circulated a list of cases he deemed unworthy of certiorari.40 Although it was
understood that any of the cases would be discussed at the request of a single Justice, such
requests came about once every other year of Hughes’ Chief Justiceship.41
37

Id. at 681–682.

38

Id. at 773.

39

Hughes, supra n. 29, at 301; Pusey, supra n. 25, at 676–677; Roberts, supra n. 25, at 209–210

(stating that Hughes never discussed merits of cases with other Justices between argument and
conference).
40

Pusey, supra n. 25, at 672.

41

Id. Hughes’s efficient approach did not meet with universal acclaim. Stone thought Hughes ran

conference like a “drill sergeant.” Ross, supra n. 29, at 221. This left inadequate time for
collective rumination of matters before the Court. Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court : The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 101–103 (Oxford U. Press 1998). Stone
tried to fill this gap by sometimes holding Friday afternoon rump sessions, which a few Justices
13

Hughes put a good deal of thought into case assignments, which he considered his “most
delicate task.”42 Although Hughes claimed that he tried to distribute important cases equally,43 he
was not averse to keeping a disproportionate number for himself (twenty-eight percent), a
smaller percentage than Taft retained (thirty-four precent) but far more than did Stone (eleven
percent).44 He kept some important opinions for himself but also shouldered his share of the
pedestrian cases.45 He often assigned controversial cases to the Justice close to the Court’s center
to minimize division.46 He tended to assign each Justice a range of cases47 while considering the
“special fitness of a Justice for writing in the particular case.”48

attended. Ross, supra n. 29, at 222; Melvin Urofsky, Division and Discord: The Supreme Court
under Stone and Vinson, 1941–1953, at 31 (U. S.C. Press 1997).
42

Hughes, supra n. 29, at 302; see also Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 904 (“No Chief Justice, I

believe, equaled Chief Justice Hughes in the skill and the wisdom and the disinterestedness with
which he made his assignments.”)
43

Hughes, supra n. 29, at 302.

44

David M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 260–261(W.W.

Norton 2005). To some extent, these numbers may reflect the Chief picking up the slack for ill or
less productive colleagues, as was true of Taft, for instance. See Ross, supra n. 29, at 230 (listing
significant cases Hughes assigned himself).
45

Roberts, supra n. 25, at 209.

46

Freund, supra n. 27, at 40.

47

Pusey, supra n. 25, at 678; Ross, supra n. 29, at 229.

48

Hughes, supra n. 29, at 302.
14

Finally, Hughes worked to achieve a consensus as broad as the Court’s composition
allowed. In part, he led by example. He rarely wrote dissenting opinions, and his institutional
commitment often caused him to acquiesce silently in a disposition rather than publish his
disagreement.49
Hughes quite clearly commanded the admiration of the Brethren, many of whom
effusively praised his leadership. Frankfurter said that Hughes “radiated authority, not through
any other quality than the intrinsic moral power that was his.”50 Douglas regarded Hughes as “a
great man.”51 So, too, did those who observed Hughes in action. Robert Jackson wrote of
Hughes’ “impressive personality” and said he “imparted strength to the Court during our time by
his character.”52 Paul Freund, who encountered Hughes as a law clerk to Brandeis, as an attorney
before the Court, and as a scholar, compared Hughes to John Marshall as a Chief Justice.53
2. Earl Warren

49

Freund, supra n. 27, at 37–38 (reporting that Hughes wrote only seventeen dissents and six

concurrences out of more than two hundred and fifty opinions).
50

Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 901.

51

Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F.

Murphy, Cassette No. 7a: January 18, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/
douglas/douglas7a.html (accessed Jan. 26, 2011).
52

Robert H. Jackson, The Judicial Career of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in The

Supreme Court and Its Justices 142–143 (Jesse H. Chopper ed., 2d ed., ABA 2001).
53

Freund, supra n. 27, at 43.
15

Warren lacked Hughes’ technical skill as lawyer yet apparently presided with welcome
authority.54 His popularity among his colleagues disposed them in his favor, and he apparently
provided able case summaries that highlighted the basic issues for decision followed with a clear
statement of his position, except in an occasional technical matter where he indicated he would
join any majority for lack of his own preference.55 Warren reportedly presided in a fair and
efficient manner and resisted the urge to argue with his colleagues, a practice that had
undermined Stone’s authority.56 Warren’s colleagues regarded him as persuasive in conference
and a hard worker.57 He drew on the skill of others to enhance his own performance. Warren and
Black often discussed pending cases before and after conferences.58 After Brennan joined the

54

Michael Belknap, The Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953–1969, at 22–23 (U. S.C. Press

2005) (quoting Stewart that Warren was “ideal” in presiding over the conference).
55

Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court 143–144 (N.Y.U. Press

1983).
56

See William J. Brennan, Jr., Chief Justice Warren, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1974) (praising

Warren’s skills presiding over conference); Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 144 (stating that Stone felt
Warren always had to get in the last word).
57

Interview by T. H. Baker with Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. (July 10, 1969)

(transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/
MarshallT/marshall.pdf) [hereinafter Marshall Interview].
58

Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made 348 (Penguin Group 2006).
16

Court, Warren regularly strategized with him, meeting every Thursday before conference in
Brennan’s chambers.59
Warren reportedly provided simple, but effective, statements of cases that focused
discussion on the underlying moral values at issue. Warren’s eloquent statement at the December
12, 1953 conference on Brown v. Board of Education60 was noteworthy in this respect.61
Although Warren said he favored “pooling all of the humble wisdom of the Court[,]” he
proceeded to state that “separate but equal” rested on the “basic premise that the Negro race is
inferior,” a conclusion Warren rejected as inconsistent with the three Civil War Amendments.62
Warren’s comments, when coupled with the prior term’s discussion of the case, signaled that a
clear majority existed to overturn Plessy and placed the constitutional issue in a moral frame that
virtually compelled the ultimate decision.63 Moreover, Warren astutely invited the conference to
discuss, but not to vote on, the case to make it easier for those with misgivings about overturning

59

Seth Stern & Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 106, 183, 250–252

(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2010); Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. Times 6 (Oct. 5,
1986).
60

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

61

Notes of Conference of December 12, 1953, in The Supreme Court in Conference: 1940–1985,

at 654 (Del Dickson ed., Oxford U. Press 2001) [hereinafter The Supreme Court in Conference].
62

Id.

63

See e.g. G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 165 (Oxford U. Press 1982) (arguing

that Warren’s statement used moral shame to attract support).
17

Plessy to change their minds later.64 Although Warren was not solely responsible for achieving
the unanimous result in Brown, he surely played an important role.65
Brown was by no means the only instance when Warren’s opening identified a broad
principle that the Court adopted. In Miranda v. Arizona,66 Warren’s conference statement
articulated the basic ideals and specific requirements that later found their way into his opinion
and commanded the essential assent of five others.67 In Loving v. Virginia,68 he declared that the
Equal Protection Clause was designed to eliminate racial discrimination, but that miscegenation
statutes “maintain white supremacy.”69 Bernard Schwartz found from his review of conference
notes that Warren was usually able to lead the Court in the direction he chose.70
Warren also excelled as a social leader, and his popularity with his colleagues
presumably enhanced his influence. He had immense interpersonal skills. The simple acts of a
64

Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F.

Murphy, Cassette No. 13: December 17, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/
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master politician paid important dividends. When Warren first arrived at the Court, he went
directly to Black’s chambers and introduced himself to Black’s office staff and law clerks—a
gesture Black appreciated.71 He asked Black for a reading list to help with opinion writing, and
after Black suggested Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Warren immediately began to read it.72 He invited
Black, as senior Justice, to continue to preside at conference initially. Warren greeted Potter
Stewart and his wife at the train station at 6:30 a.m. when they first arrived in Washington,
D.C.73 Warren routinely met other Justices, even those most junior, in their chambers rather than
summoning them to his, persisting in the practice even when they protested that protocol
demanded that they visit him.74 This show of humility—institutional and personal—helped
endear Warren to his associates. Warren personally hand-delivered his draft of the opinion in
Brown to each of his colleagues, even taking it to Jackson in the hospital,75 a gesture that
signaled deference of a new Chief Justice for a senior colleague and afforded an opportunity for
conversation, in addition to addressing the underlying confidentiality concerns associated with
transporting the opinion outside of the Court. Warren won favor with other actions too, like
lobbying Congress (unsuccessfully) to provide cars and drivers for the Justices76 or resisting
71
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efforts to increase the differential between his salary and that of the associate Justices from fivehundred dollars to twenty-five hundred dollars.77
Warren also cultivated his colleagues socially—an enterprise that must have come
naturally for someone Brennan recalled as being “marvelous with people.”78 Warren and his
family spent holidays with the Blacks; he hunted79 and walked80 with Clark; and he attended
sporting events and otherwise regularly socialized with Brennan.81 He persuaded all of his
colleagues (except Black and Frankfurter) to join him at the Army-Navy football game most
years; the Justices traveled to the game by rail during which time they socialized with one
another and their families over breakfast and dinner.82
Save for Frankfurter and sometimes Douglas, Warren’s colleagues spoke of him
effusively.83 Brennan regarded him as “the Super-Chief.”84 Stewart called Warren “an instinctive
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leader whom you respected and for whom you had an affection.”85 Clark thought Warren would
be viewed as the equal to, or greater than, John Marshall;86 Douglas ranked him with Marshall
and Hughes.87 Marshall described Warren as “one of the greatest people who ever lived” and
thought history would rank him “probably the greatest Chief Justice who ever lived.”88 Goldberg
exaggerated only slightly in judging Warren as “beloved by all his brethren.”89 Fortas said that
Warren “provided an essence, an attitude, which set the tone and quality of the Court’s work.”90
Warren distributed assignments fairly, making an effort to give all members some
opportunity to write important cases.91 As with other Chief Justices, he wrote many of the
historic decisions, such as Brown, Bolling v. Sharpe,92 Reynolds v. Sims,93 Miranda v. Arizona,
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Loving, and Powell v. McCormack.94 Yet he also bore more than his share of those less
coveted.95 He often relied on Brennan to write delicate opinions or to preserve a narrow majority,
as in Cooper v. Aaron96 or Baker v. Carr.97 Yet strategic concerns probably dictated the
assignments to Clark in Abington v. Schempp,98 Heart of Atlanta v. United States,99 and Mapp v.
Ohio,100 and to Stewart in Katz v. United States101—cases where a more conservative author
might help keep the majority intact and gain greater public acceptance.
2. William Howard Taft
The Taft tenure demonstrated that a Chief Justice can, under certain circumstances, be
highly successful without providing both task and social leadership. Taft, according to Danelski,
acted as the Court’s social leader while his appointee, friend, and ally, Van Devanter, emerged as
the task leader of the conference.102 Taft’s good nature apparently paid dividends in easing
tensions on the Court, and he quickly achieved cordial relations with Brandeis,103 with whom he
94
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had previously endured high-stakes, public, and acrimonious clashes.104 The rapprochement
reflected their reciprocal efforts, but Taft certainly did his part, by going out of his way to be
solicitous about Brandeis’ health and feelings and accommodating Brandeis’ views and
suggestions when he could. Taft’s outreach was consistent with his “very genial”105 personality,
but it also reflected his desire to have the Court work collegially as a team.106 Taft valued
unanimity highly and accordingly tried to foster a climate conducive to compromise.107 The Taft
Court demonstrated a high degree of cohesion, handing down unanimous decisions eighty-four
percent of the time. Taft set an example in this respect, writing only about two dissents a year.108
Taft won favor with his colleagues generally by generous and sensitive gestures towards
them, ranging from Christmas cards, rides, and gift salmons, to arranging for the funeral of Mrs.
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Holmes at Arlington.109 Taft’s conduct in assigning opinions also no doubt endeared him to his
colleagues. He wrote more than his share of the Court’s opinions, in part because he assigned
himself cases in areas like patent law, which others preferred to avoid, and he took on extra work
when a colleague was ill or fell behind.110 Brandeis credited Taft with “admirable” personal
qualities, with smoothing out problems, and with conducting a harmonious conference.111
Although Taft lacked the legal skills that Hughes was to display, Van Devanter helped
fill that void. Van Devanter’s writer’s block limited his output of opinions,112 but his knowledge
of procedure, the Court’s precedents, and his ability at legal analysis were highly valued by his
colleagues.113 He often strategized with Taft before conference and reviewed memoranda before
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the Chief circulated them to the other chambers.114 Brandeis claimed that Van Devanter ran the
Court due to his knowledge of federal law and his willingness to be helpful to his colleagues.115
C. Unsuccessful Chief Justices
By contrast, the Chief Justiceships of Stone, Vinson, and Burger have not been regarded
as successful in terms of leading the Court. The Court fell victim to internecine strife during the
Chief Justiceships of Stone and Vinson, whom Herbert Johnson suggests “share the unenviable
distinction of being perhaps the least collegial and most internally vindictive periods of the
Court’s history.”116
1. Harlan Fiske Stone
Although Stone came highly recommended as Chief Justice,117 he proved miscast in the
center seat. Stone conducted conference quite differently than Hughes, in part due to his reaction
to Hughes’ style of leadership, in part because he valued unanimity less and dissents more, and
in part due to his own temperament. Stone’s praise of Hughes for not seeking “unanimity at the
cost of the sacrifice . . . of strongly held convictions” and for recognizing the historic role of
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dissents,118 probably described Stone’s values more accurately than Hughes’ performance. Stone
was more the academic than the man of action—a jurist whose contributions came more from his
pen than his command.
Stone often came to conference without having reached a resolution of the matters for
decision. His statements of cases lacked the authority of Hughes’ renditions and accordingly
others embellished on them and competed for de facto leadership of the Court. Rather than
presiding, he tended to join the debates.119 Believing Hughes’ efficiency sacrificed full
exploration of the issues, Stone allowed discussion to continue interminably.120 Stone
exacerbated matters by debating with others who differed with his views,121 thereby sacrificing
any ability to police the discussions. Whatever the benefits of longer deliberations, they had
negative byproducts.122 Disposing of the Court’s work became a more arduous enterprise as
118
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additional sessions were required to complete deliberation. Rather than being Saturday’s work,
conferences often continued on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.123 Moreover, disagreements
between strong-willed members of the Black and Frankfurter wings of the Court often dominated
the discussions and perhaps exacerbated some of the divisions between the Justices.124 Stone
apparently made derogatory comments about Black, which later became known to Black, thereby
tempering his regard for the Chief Justice.125
2. Fred Vinson
Vinson lacked the legal skill of Hughes or Stone. He was a sociable person and a number
of his colleagues liked him personally.126 That did not translate into professional respect,
however, from colleagues who viewed him as lazy and lackluster.127 Frankfurter’s famous
comment at Vinson’s funeral in September, 1953 (“This is the first indication I have ever had
that there is a God.”)128 may have revealed more about Frankfurter than about Vinson, yet it
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reflected a perception that Vinson was more obstacle than answer in the Court’s effort to find a
consensus solution in the then pending school-segregation cases. Even Henry Abraham’s effort
to present an even-handed judgment concludes that “overall . . . Vinson demonstrated an
astonishing lack of leadership: the role of [C]hief [J]ustice was simply beyond his ken.”129
Vinson at times upset colleagues by acting in the more autocratic manner of a congressional
committee chair or cabinet official in circumstances when such hierarchical authority did not
reside in the Chief Justice.130 Vinson, though not otherwise a successful Chief Justice, distributed
majority opinions evenly and indeed kept few “plums” for himself.131 The Court rarely acted
unanimously and dissents proliferated.
3. Warren E. Burger
Burger forfeited his roles of task and social leader by occasional inept and obtuse
conduct. Like Stone and Vinson, he failed to impose structure on the conference, to his
colleagues’ regret.132 His statements of the case were reportedly unimpressive and often
http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas17.html) (describing Vinson as
lacking “the elements of greatness” of other Chief Justices).
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incomplete.133 He imposed little discipline but allowed each Justice to interrupt others and speak
as long as he or she wished.134 As a consequence, senior Justices often spoke multiple times
before junior Justices were able to make their initial contribution, and often little was left to be
said by the time the end of the queue was reached.135 Conferences frequently continued into the
following day.136 Burger sometimes did not record conference votes correctly. Whether this
failing was strategic or reflected carelessness, it was not appreciated.137 Burger did not
distinguish himself as a jurist or command the respect of his colleagues.138 Other Justices rewrote
a number of opinions in significant cases he assigned himself.139 Unlike Hughes, he was not a
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proficient technical lawyer, and unlike Warren, he did not identify compelling ideals to furnish a
foundation for constitutional jurisprudence. Burger often joined but rarely formed majorities in
important cases.140
Burger compounded his failings as a task leader with social shortcomings.141 He upset
some members of the Court by moving a desk into the Court’s conference room and
appropriating it as his reception room.142 Some colleagues resented his perceived practice of
deferring initial comment and then strategically voting with the winning side so he, rather than
Douglas or Brennan, would assign the Court’s opinion.143 His officious manner alienated
Blackmun, his childhood friend.144 The disparaging portrait of Burger in The Brethren,
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)); Woodward & Armstrong, supra n. 138, at 315–346 (describing
rewrites of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1975)).
140
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apparently came in part from interviews with at least five of his colleagues, including many
whom were ideologically closest to him.145
D. William H. Rehnquist
Just five years after the end of an almost nineteen-year tenure, it is too early to assess
fully the Rehnquist Chief Justiceship. Five of the eleven who served with him as associate
Justices remain on the Court,146 important papers remain closed, and the fate of some strands of
Rehnquist Court jurisprudence still hangs in the balance. Yet a few words are appropriate, not
only because of the length of his service (the longest since Melville Fuller died a century ago),
but because Chief Justice Roberts served as his law clerk when Rehnquist was an associate
Justice.147
Rehnquist surely had his impact, yet it is unclear that as Chief Justice he led the Court in
crafting sustainable doctrine of the significance of that associated with Hughes and Warren.
Moreover, the disposition of the major crisis on his watch—Bush v. Gore148—remains
controversial and the extent of his leadership remains hidden. Accordingly, Henry Abraham’s
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conclusion that Rehnquist was “a great [C]hief [J]ustice,”149 seems generous and premature. Of
the seven Justices who served with him just prior to, and who issued statements upon, his death,
only Justice O’Connor used the word “great” in assessing his service.150
Nonetheless, Rehnquist appears to have successfully led the conference and left a mark as
Chief Justice. If Rehnquist’s final group of colleagues generally did not label him “great,” the
others all did use the words “fair” or “fairness” to describe him.151 Although Justice O’Connor
said she liked Chief Justice Burger, she described Rehnquist as a “terrific” and “wonderful Chief
Justice.”152 Rehnquist presided in a “humble fashion,” “put on no airs at all,” and “held no
grudges”153—assessments that were not often used in connection with Burger and accordingly
draw a contrast. She credited Rehnquist with preserving harmonious personal relations among
Justices with divergent jurisprudential approaches.154 Kennedy described Rehnquist as someone
149
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150
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who stated his positions forcefully, but respected the “deliberative process,” and who was “a
brilliant, effective, and dedicated Chief Justice.”155 Justices who often disagreed with Rehnquist
on high-profile matters, such as Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Ginsburg, were among those
who praised his performance as Chief Justice.156 That consensus signaled a professional respect
for Rehnquist’s role as a task and social leader in marked contrast with their appraisals of his
predecessor.
Rehnquist did not see conference as an occasion to change minds, and accordingly, he
conducted them efficiently without opportunity for extended discussion. Rehnquist also deployed
opinion writing assignments to achieve strategic objectives. Although Rehnquist initially would
seek to distribute them equally each term, he would minimize assignments during the second half
of a term to a Justice who was slow to circulate a majority or dissenting opinion or to vote in a
case in which opinions had circulated.157 This practice, which was communicated to the other
155

Anthony M. Kennedy, William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor: An Expression of

Appreciation, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1663, 1664, 1667 (2006).
156

Robert J. Giuffra, A Tribute to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1675,

1676 (2006); see also O’Brein, supra n. 44, at 200–201 (stating that Brennan and Marshall
praised Rehnquist as a “‘splendid’ [C]hief [J]ustice”); Savage, supra n. 133, at 14 (reporting
praise of Rehnquist as Chief Justice from Brennan and Marshall); Blackmun Interview, supra n.
136 (discussing Rehnquist’s fair assignment of cases); Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great? The
Atlantic (Apr. 2005) (available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/04/
rehnquist-the-great/3820/) (describing how even liberals may come to view the conservative
Chief Justice as successful).
157

O’Brien, supra n. 44, at 200–201.
33

Justices, promoted efficiency in part by giving Justices incentive to complete their writing and to
act so the Court could issue opinions expeditiously.
Just as Stone’s appreciation of Hughes signaled some of his own values, it is possible that
what Chief Justice Roberts wrote of his predecessor may provide clues regarding his
performance. Roberts admired Rehnquist’s intellectual curiosity, his lack of pretense, his direct
manner, and his sense of whimsy, and Roberts described him as “a genuinely kind, thoughtful,
and decent man.”158 Years before his Court experienced a presidential rebuke at the State of the
Union,159 Roberts spoke admiringly of Rehnquist’s decision to skip one such occasion when it
conflicted with his painting class.160 Roberts called his former boss “a towering figure in
American law” and, more pertinent to this piece, “one of a handful of great Chief Justices.”161
II.

The Impact of Context

Success as Chief Justice, as in other leadership positions, depends on context as well as
skill. Some background conditions remain relatively constant. For instance, the position of Chief
Justice confers little hierarchical advantage. Unlike the President’s Cabinet, the Court adheres to
“one person, one vote,” having done so long before the Court recognized that formula as a
constitutional principle.162 The Chief cannot remove other Justices and, except for the Taft
158

John G. Roberts, Jr., In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2005).

159

Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. Times A12

(Jan. 29, 2010).
160

Roberts, supra n. 158, at 2.

161

Id.

162

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (stating that “one person, one vote” is a concept

that has existed since the Declaration of Independence).
34

anomaly of a Chief Justice who had, as President, appointed some of his colleagues, cannot
expect loyalty from grateful associates who owe their positions to him.
Yet the context also presents variable elements that shape the historic possibilities of a
Chief Justice. Chief Justices have presided under varying circumstances that presented different
opportunities and constraints. Although history furnishes no mechanism to test counterfactuals,
circumstance surely creates leadership opportunities and impacts outcomes and accordingly
history’s assessments. Important contextual factors include Court composition as well as the
issues that the times present.
A. The Composition of the Court
The makeup of the Court affects the context in which a Chief Justice operates.
Composition may impact a Chief Justice’s fortunes in at least three ways.
1. Ideological Balance
Chief Justices need to operate differently depending on the ideological balance on the
Court and where they fall on the relevant spectrum relative to their colleagues. Some successful
Chiefs have been centrists in the context of their Court. Taft, for instance, occupied a center
position along with Sanford and McKenna.163 Hughes’ influence too, was enhanced by his
ideological position on the Court. He and Roberts occupied the middle of a Court that often164
divided between Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter to the right and Holmes (or
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Cardozo), Brandeis, and Stone on the left.165 When Hughes and Roberts reached the same
resolution, and sometimes when they did not, Hughes was able to dictate the outcome of many
cases.166 Roberts was closest to Hughes personally and ideologically and that double proximity
enhanced Hughes’ clout.
A Chief who occupies the center position is in a strong position to lead. His vote can
decide many cases, thereby expanding his bargaining strength. His colleagues have additional
reason to curry his favor. Not only can he reward them through the assignment power, he also
can help those with strong predilections see their preferred outcomes prevail and perhaps see
their views shape doctrine.
Whereas Taft and Hughes gained influence from their position at or near the Court’s
center, Warren ultimately emerged as the leader of the Court’s liberal wing. In that position, he
operated at different times in at least three distinct contexts. During the early years of his Chief
Justiceship, he sometimes found himself as part of a minority faction, often with Black and
Douglas. Following the appointment of Brennan in 1956,167 the so-called liberal wing grew to
include four reliable Justices.168 This development enhanced Warren’s position, not only by
bringing him within a single vote of a majority in many cases, but also by adding Brennan’s
strategic skills to his coalition.169 This circumstance lent greater significance to Warren’s
165
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interpersonal skills, and he was often able to persuade Clark to join them.170 Once Arthur
Goldberg replaced Frankfurter in 1962, Warren was the leader of a generally reliable liberal
majority, which allowed him to achieve results consistent with his philosophy.171
Like Warren, Rehnquist was the leader of an ideological faction, yet his Chief Justiceship
reveals a fourth position that can provide leadership opportunity. After Justice Clarence Thomas
joined the Court in 1992, Rehnquist found himself essentially in the center of a five-Justice
conservative block consisting of himself and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
Although Rehnquist could not keep this group together on some issues of importance to him, like
abortion or school prayer, he was able to achieve narrow majorities in a number of federalism
cases.172 Rehnquist often wrote the majority opinion in the first case in an area in order to
produce an opinion that all five would join before distributing the pen to others.
And yet simply being part of the Court’s majority has not always been a measure of
success for a Chief Justice. In important cases, Vinson frequently was part of a majority
consisting of himself, Reed, the three other Truman appointees (Burton, Clark, and Minton), and
170
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often Jackson.173 Nonetheless, Vinson is not generally credited with having constructed the
coalition nor is the resulting jurisprudence as a whole remembered as historic.174 Burger sided
with the majority in many of the most significant cases during his tenure, yet was not viewed as
their architect.
2. Complementary Allies
The success of a Chief Justice may depend, in part, on the presence of dependable allies
who possess talents that complement and supplement his or her own. Taft, for instance, was not a
great technical lawyer but was able to rely on Van Devanter to provide that form of professional
leadership for the Court.175 Warren benefited from the presence of Brennan, a master strategist
who was able to persuade colleagues to adopt his position and to craft opinions in a manner that
would attract five votes.176
It is not enough simply to have friends—Stanley Reed had managed Vinson’s
congressional campaigns,177 and Tom Clark was Vinson’s colleague in Truman’s Cabinet.178
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Vinson and Clark often voted together179 yet their friendship did not enable Vinson to succeed as
Chief Justice.180 What adds particular value are allies who bring needed qualities to the table.
Moreover, a Chief Justice can only exploit the resources the Court’s personnel provides if
he or she fairly assesses his or her own limitations and needs, and forms alliances with those who
can help him or her. Taft was willing to use Van Devanter or even Brandeis to provide the
technical help his Court needed.181 Warren certainly benefitted from Brennan’s talents, yet it was
to Warren’s credit that he recognized areas in which he could use help and was willing to seek it
from Brennan.182 By contrast, Burger’s apparently inflated self-assessment may have
undermined his ability to lead.183
3. The Dispositions around the Table
The mix of personalities around the table also affects a Chief’s ability to lead. The tasks
of Stone and Vinson were surely complicated by the presence of Black, Frankfurter, Douglas,
and Jackson on the Court. They were strong-willed individuals who approached many legal
issues quite differently once the questions relating to federal legislative power and economic
substantive due process were resolved in the late Hughes years. All were highly intelligent,
energetic, and not averse to giving voice, written and oral, to their convictions. Their propensity
to concur and dissent, sometimes at length, consumed time that might have been spent producing
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majority opinions. Moreover, Frankfurter and Douglas were capable of real nastiness, which
introduced an acrimonious tenor to Court deliberations.184 The Court was increasingly divided,
and often the opinions reflected the personal tensions.185
Of course, Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas also served under Hughes (and Warren)
without being as disruptive, individually and collectively, as they were under Stone and Vinson.
No doubt that reflected Hughes’s (and Warren’s) interpersonal skill. Hughes, after all, was able
to manage a Court with McReynolds and Butler, neither of whom presented easy personalities.
Yet Hughes also benefited from the fact that Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas served their first
years on his Court at a time when they were still finding their way and had not divided
ideologically or personally. Additionally, they may have showed someone of Hughes’s rare
stature a degree of deference they did not accord Stone, with whom they had served as a fellow
Associate Justice.
Warren won the affection of his colleagues with the exception of Frankfurter, who
clearly irritated him.186 Although Jackson’s death in 1954 cost the Court a gifted Justice,187
Bernard Schwartz suggests that Jackson’s death may have eased Warren’s task, since Black and
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Jackson were personally antagonistic to one another.188 Frankfurter, of course, remained to stir
the pot, but he also alienated many of his colleagues by the condescending manner in which he
approached them. A more politic adversary may have complicated Warren’s leadership task
during the first part of his service. And Frankfurter’s retirement in 1962 made the Court more
harmonious during the last half of Warren’s service.
Warren also may have been fortunate that the Court he joined included a number of
former politicians. Black, Burton, and Minton were former senators;189 Jackson and Clark had
been Attorney General.190 They no doubt had a fair measure of professional respect for Warren.
Moreover, these men were sensitive to political considerations and, in many respects, were
receptive to Warren’s approach to constitutional issues. Some who later joined the Court, like
Brennan, Harlan, Stewart, White, and Fortas, were also pretty pragmatic people.
This discussion of Warren’s colleagues suggests another generalization. A Chief Justice’s
influence also turns on how amenable his or her colleagues are to being persuaded. Warren
served with a number of people who were more practical than ideological. They may have been
susceptible to Warren’s reason or charm in a way that a rival ideologue would not have been.
Taft and Hughes served among colleagues predisposed in their favor. Taft had appointed
Van Devanter, with whom he served for sixteen years and played a considerable role in securing
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an associate justiceship for Pierce Butler.191 Taft almost always served with five or six other
conservative Justices and accordingly was in a position to lead the Court in a direction with
which he sympathized.192
Although Hughes experienced a somewhat rocky confirmation battle in the Senate, he
joined a Court that was glad to have him. Paul Freund pointed out that one attitude that Holmes
and Brandeis shared with Van Devanter and McReynolds was their pleasure in Hughes’
appointment,193 a sentiment widely shared on the Hughes Court.
Other circumstances also gave Taft and Hughes some advantages in achieving a
consensus that Vinson and Stone lacked. Brandeis may have been a great dissenter but he felt a
strong institutional loyalty to the Court. As such, Brandeis looked for opportunities to work with
Taft, and on a number of cases, their common efforts helped achieve Taft’s ambition to mass the
Court. Van Devanter had trouble writing,194 McReynolds was lazy,195 and Holmes was slipping
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during Hughes’ service,196 all of which may have reduced their propensity to dissent.
Conversely, Stone and Vinson had Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson in their primes, a
collection that made unity more elusive.
B. What Arises on a Chief’s Watch
What matters arise during the term of a Chief Justice will also affect his opportunity to
lead in a manner that history recalls. Hughes led the Court through the crisis the Court faced
when the constitutional jurisprudence of the first third of the twentieth century collided with the
politics of the New Deal.197 The Court was no doubt fortunate that Hughes was its leader when
President Franklin Roosevelt proposed his “Court-packing plan,”198 but that crisis also
contributed to Hughes’ place in history by furnishing a stage on which he could star. Hughes
drafted a “masterful letter” to Senator Burton Wheeler that refuted Roosevelt’s arguments in
convincing fashion199 and generally outmaneuvered Roosevelt.
Dwight Eisenhower did not put Warren on the Court to handle the assault on “separate
but equal,” but that work, from Brown in 1954 to Loving in 1967, essentially framed Warren’s
196
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service. Warren’s leadership in that area was certainly not all history recalls of his tenure, which
included major doctrinal shifts regarding criminal procedure,200 reapportionment,201 and
privacy,202 among other areas. But it, along with these other areas, formed a coherent record of
judicial leadership that history has largely viewed in a positive manner.
That Brown arose at the beginning of Warren’s tenure was fortuitous in terms of his
professional standing. The unanimous opinion in Brown was rightfully seen as among Warren’s
great contributions. It established his credentials in a way that provided an early infusion of
capital in his account, with history and with his colleagues.
The timing of Brown illustrates another important point. When matters arise may affect a
Chief’s legacy. Warren may have been fortunate that Brown arose at the very outset of his term
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when leaders of the Court’s competing wings were vying for his favor and accordingly may have
been more receptive to his leadership.
Yet the accidents of timing should not be overestimated in accounting for Hughes’s and
Warren’s success. The appearance of great cases did not propel Stone203 or Burger204 to
successful stints as Chief Justice. Yes, the reputations of Hughes and Warren benefitted from the
circumstances they were dealt, yet their presence and leadership also shaped American history
and the position of the Court.
III Different Models
These sketches of recent Chief Justices caution against associating success in that
position with tangible factors in any formulaic way. The differences among the very successful
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Chief Justices far exceeded their similarities, and the qualities found in some successful Chief
Justices also appeared in some who fared less well.
For instance, extraordinary legal skill and experience help, but do not guarantee success,
as Chief Justice. Hughes was a great lawyer who had extensive experience at the upper echelons
of his profession.205 Yet the same might be said about Stone, who was Attorney General and a
highly regarded Associate Justice. Warren, by contrast, had relatively modest experience as a
lawyer.206 Yet Hughes and Warren succeeded whereas Stone did not.
Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist had served on the Court prior to being named its Chief.
They were familiar with the Court and its operations. Their conduct as Chief Justice in part
represented a reaction to that of the Chief Justice under whom each had served.207 Conversely,
Warren was a neophyte regarding the Court. But for Vinson’s unexpected death, he was destined
205
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to become Solicitor General to prepare him for a later move to the Court.208 When he arrived at
the Court much earlier than expected, he needed to spend time understanding the basic roles of
Court employees and observing a few conferences before he took the helm.
Nor does prior judicial experience correlate with success as Chief Justice. Seven of the
eight Chief Justices since Taft had prior judicial experience. Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist had
served on the Court; Taft, Vinson, Burger, and John Roberts had been appellate court judges.
Warren had not. The novice Warren succeeded as did some, but not all, of the seasoned jurists.
Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist were gifted intellects. Warren was not,209 although as
Justice Stewart pointed out, to his credit he did not pretend to be one.210
Nor does prior relationship with others on the Court guarantee success as Chief Justice.
Taft, Hughes, and Rehnquist came to the Court with strong relations with most of its members
and these prior relationships no doubt aided them. The same advantage did not confer success on
Stone or Vinson, each of whom was well-acquainted with most of their colleagues. And
Warren’s lack of a prior relationship with his colleagues211 did not inhibit his success as their
leader.
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Even running conference does not need to follow one method. Hughes and Rehnquist
apparently operated most efficiently whereas Stone, Vinson, and Burger were less structured.
Yet Warren apparently allowed substantial discussion without loss of control.212
Nor does success depend upon occupying a particular place in the ideological spectrum.
Taft and Hughes were centrists on their Courts but Vinson probably was, too. Warren and
Rehnquist successfully led factions at opposite wings of their Courts, but Stone also had been a
somewhat ideological jurist, yet was unsuccessful as Chief Justice.
Finally, the secret of success does not reside in the manner of seeking to establish Court
majorities. Hughes avoided discussions of cases outside of conference unless initiated by one of
his colleagues. Warren, however, frequently engaged in one-on-one and small-group discussions
to good effect. His “persuasive powers” helped entice Reed and perhaps others to make the
majority opinion in Brown unanimous.213 Yet whereas Warren’s efforts enhanced his leadership,
Burger apparently more often offended his colleagues through these efforts.
Notwithstanding the absence of one precise mold from which the successful Chief
Justices are cut, less tangible attributes do seem to be associated with successful Chief Justices.
First, success requires that a Chief Justice discharge functions with professional skill. Taft,
Hughes, Warren, and Rehnquist, in different ways, met this challenge. All worked hard, came to
conference well-prepared, and distributed work strategically, yet fairly. Those who have been
212
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less successful were deficient in one or more of those respects. Stone was not a leader; Vinson
was lazy; Burger was mediocre.
Second, interpersonal skills matter. Taft, Hughes, Warren, and Rehnquist were successful
social leaders who conducted their relations with the other justices in a collegial fashion.
Disagreement did not make them disagreeable. A Chief Justice’s charm cannot eliminate all
strife214 but social skills can mitigate tension and promote collegiality. Stone and Burger were
less skilled in dealing with others. They could not draw from personal capital with their
associates, and the atmosphere surrounding their Courts deteriorated.
Third, those who were most successful understood both the limits and possibilities of
their role as Chief Justice, taking account of the powers their position conferred and the context
in which they operated. Taft, Hughes, and Warren understood pretty quickly that their power
came from their ability to persuade, and they acted to maximize their ability to do so. A
successful government bureaucrat like Vinson or law school dean like Stone may find that being
Chief Justice does not confer the accustomed benefits a hierarchical structure affords other
leaders.
Moreover, those who succeeded managed to pursue achievable goals through appropriate
strategies. Warren could operate differently after Brennan joined the Court than before;215
Goldberg’s arrival changed the equation further.216 Warren adapted to changing circumstances.
214

Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 898–900 (discussing conflicts on the Court notwithstanding Taft’s

social talents).
215

See Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 205–206 (discussing the close relationship between Warren and

Brennan).
216

See id. at 446 (explaining how Goldberg became one of Warren’s strongest supporters).
49

Stone, by contrast, apparently failed to appreciate the peril to his position as Court leader of
debating the points each colleague made.
Fourth, the successful Chief Justices demonstrated awareness about themselves and the
context in which they functioned. Taft and Warren understood that they lacked some technical
skills but borrowed them from Van Devanter and Brennan respectively. Conversely, Burger’s
pretentious behavior alienated some of his colleagues.217
Fifth, it helps if the Chief Justice really enjoys shouldering the extra burdens that position
imposes. Clearly, Taft, Hughes, and Warren relished being Chief Justice, and that attitude
probably contributed to their success. Stone’s views were ambivalent at best. He once likened
being Chief Justice to being a law school dean, a position he had also held, since both have “to
do the things that the janitor will not do.”218 The administrative demands weighed on him, and he
viewed them as a distraction from judging, the activity he most enjoyed.219 Burger gravitated to
his administrative and ceremonial roles regarding the judiciary and legal profession and
contributed in these respects, but one wonders whether his preoccupation with those parts of the
job came at the expense of judging and working with his colleagues.
The common ingredient of those who found success as Chief Justice was the ability to
lead given the opportunities and confines of the position. Leadership, Robert Steamer observed,
“is intrinsic.”220 It requires professional and interpersonal skill, energy, awareness—and
something more.
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Hughes, Warren, and Taft all brought unique stature to the Court based on their imposing
resumes. Hughes’s experience included service as Governor of New York, Associate Justice,
Republican presidential candidate in 1916, and Secretary of State.221 Warren had been a highly
successful Governor of California and Republican vice-presidential candidate;222 Taft, an
appellate court judge, Secretary of War, and President.223
Yet their stature rested on more than the credits on their resumes. Hughes, Paul Freund
observed, exuded a “Jovian figure.”224 One suspects his presence inspired a difficult bunch.
“Everybody was better because of Toscanini Hughes, the leader of the orchestra,” Frankfurter
wrote, “[o]ne man is able to bring things out of you that are there, if they’re evoked, if they’re
sufficiently stimulated, sufficiently directed. Chief Justice Hughes had that very great quality.”225
Hughes’ professional reputation and public standing also enhanced the Court’s stature.
Jackson credited Hughes’s presence as helping the Court weather the storm during the 1930s
when it abandoned some recent and long-standing precedents.226 Hughes was “a symbol of
stability as well as of progress” whose presence “gave the country a sense of steadiness.”227
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Warren brought some of these same qualities. “The most important feature of Earl
Warren’s [C]hief [J]usticeship,” legal historian Ted White wrote, “was his presence. . . . He was
regarded as one of the great Chief Justices in American history because of the intangible but
undeniable impact of his presence on the Court.”228
Ultimately, the greatest Chief Justices are measured not simply by their ability to lead,
but by the direction and distance they took the Court and constitutional law. Hughes
outmaneuvered Roosevelt on the court-packing plan and led the Court in doctrinal directions that
accommodated the New Deal. Warren led the Court through doctrinal revolutions regarding civil
rights, criminal procedure, and legislative apportionment. As John Hart Ely wrote of Warren,
“[h]e was a leader because he was a man with a mission, and because the mission was good.”229
IV.

Speculating on Chief Justice Roberts

Although it is premature to assess John Roberts’ influence as Chief Justice, the preceding
discussion offers some measures to inform speculation on that score. Roberts certainly brings
imposing assets to his position. He came to the Court after a highly successful career as a
Supreme Court advocate;230 he is perhaps the ablest lawyer to serve as Chief Justice since
Hughes. He clearly is very bright and energetic, well-versed in the work of the Court, and
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curious about it. His professional record leaves no doubt regarding his abilities to read and
master an appellate record and the relevant cases, to frame issues in a compelling manner, to
distinguish cases, to anticipate consequences of doctrinal choices, and to respond to arguments.
Roberts’ formidable talent and success as an appellate advocate makes him well-suited to lead
the Court in its tasks.
Roberts also gives every appearance of possessing strong interpersonal skills. He has a
reputation for working well with people who have differing viewpoints.231 As O’Connor wrote,
“[f]ew have made the transition as seamlessly and effectively as Roberts. He knew our traditions
well, as he had clerked in 1980 for then Associate Justice Rehnquist. His sense of humor and
articulate nature and calm demeanor combine to make him a very effective Chief.”232 Roberts
does not bring the stature of a Taft, Hughes, or Warren. Yet neither did Rehnquist, who
nonetheless served successfully as Chief Justice.
Some of Roberts’ actions suggest that institutional concerns may guide his conduct to a
greater degree than that of most of his colleagues. During the last five years, he has voted with
the majority more often than virtually all of the other Justices. As shown below,233 in three of his
five terms on the Court, he voted in the majority as or more often than any other member of the
231

Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, The New Yorker (May 25, 2009) (available at

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin).
232

Sandra Day O’Connor, John Roberts, Time Magazine (Apr. 30, 2006) (available at

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1187207,00.html#ixzz19cWN2SGn).
233

Data in these tables is taken from the annual StatPack releases at SCOTUSblog. Tom

Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, Stat Pack, http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack/ (accessed
Jan. 19, 2011).
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Court. Of course, other explanations may account for this tendency. It could reflect Roberts’
influence in shaping majorities or suggest that he is the Court’s pivot point. Yet it seems more
plausible to believe that Roberts may sometimes join an apparent majority either to control the
opinion assignment or to foster institutional solidarity or both, since the former may be simply a
means to achieve the latter.
ROBERTS’ MAJORITY OPINIONS
OT05

OT06

OT07

OT08

OT 09

Rank

1

2

1

3(tie)

1(tie)

Percentage

93

88.4

89.7

81

91

Not only does Roberts rarely dissent, but he writes fewer dissenting opinions than does
virtually any other Justice. In part, the paucity of his dissenting opinions may relate to the
frequency with which he is in the majority. Yet Roberts also seems to write fewer dissents than
most of the other Justices with high majority scores. In fact, of those on the Court since Roberts
became Chief Justice, only Kennedy has written fewer dissents.234 Roberts has never been the
lone dissenter.235

234

Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, Final Super StatPack OT09, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-

content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf (July 7, 2010).
235

Id. Excluding newly-appointed Justice Kagan, Justice Sotomayor was the only other Justice

not to have filed a lone dissent but she had only been on the Court for one term. Id. By
54

ROBERTS’ DISSENTING OPINIONS
OT05

OT06

OT07

OT08

OT 09

Dissenting Opinions

3

3

4

5

3

Rank

7-8 (tie)

8

7-9(tie)

7

9

Range for Court

3-14

1-14

4-11

3-15

3-12

Finally, Roberts also writes relatively few concurring opinions. In part, his opinion
assignment power may be a factor. He may be able to choose authors who write majority
opinions in a manner that gives him little reason to supplement the Court’s written record. On the
other hand, Roberts may restrain himself in order to promote institutional solidarity.
ROBERTS’ CONCURRING OPINIONS
OT05

OT06

OT07

OT08

OT09

Concurring Opinions

2

1

5

4

2

Rank

7-8 (tie)

9

6

6-7 (tie)

9

Range for Court

2-7

1-10

1-10

2-9

2-13

Roberts has received credit in some instances where observers have seen his hand in
crafting relatively narrow holdings that commanded a Court consensus instead of broader but
divided results.236 Such judgments must be offered tentatively since the absence of information
comparison, Stevens and Thomas had filed ten lone dissents, Souter four, Ginsburg two, and
Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito one each. Id.
236

See e.g. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010) (seven to two decision

upholding, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a federal law authorizing civil commitment
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about the Justices’ initial positions sometimes obscures whether Roberts forged a minimalist
consensus “as an act of judicial statesmanship” or made a “strategic retreat.”237 His concurring
opinion in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn.,238 in which he defended the majority’s
opinion from the charge that it reflected judicial activism in reaching to decide an issue not
necessarily before the Court and in not according proper respect to precedent, reflects concerns
regarding the Court’s institutional standing although it might also be seen as an effort to plant
seeds for later attacks on other doctrine.
Yet Roberts clearly has not abandoned his convictions, and in some areas he has
aggressively pursued jurisprudential goals.239 Quite clearly, he is not simply content to make the
engines run smoothly; there are some directions in which he wishes to lead the Court. Other
contributions to this symposium have explored the substantive decisions of the Roberts Court in
greater depth, but a few snapshots may contribute to the evolving portrait of the work of its Chief
Justice.

of a federal prisoner); N.W. Austin Mun. Util. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2516–2517 (2009)
(eight to one decision resolving voting-rights case on technical rather than constitutional
ground).
237

Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts versus Roberts, The New Republic (Mar. 2, 2010) (available at

http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/roberts-versus-roberts).
238

130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).

239

Rosen, supra n. 237.
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Although other Justices have drawn their share of high-profile controversial opinions,240
Roberts has certainly not avoided writing contested decisions241 nor has he always written them
in a manner designed to minimize the disputed area. Perhaps the most glaring example occurred
240

See e.g. McDonald v. Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Alito writing 5 to 4 opinion holding

Second Amendment limits power of states to restrict gun possession); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
at 917 (Kennedy, writing a five to four opinion invalidating restrictions on corporate
expenditures in political campaigns); D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Scalia writing a
five to four opinion holding the Second Amendment confers an individual right to gun
possession); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 130–132, 168 (2007) (Kennedy writing a five to
four opinion upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute banning partial-birth abortion
despite absence of exception to protect health of woman).
241

See e.g. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acctg. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3164 (2010)

(writing a five to four opinion holding law unconstitutionally infringed president’s power by
giving executive power to officials beyond president’s control); D.A.’s Off. v. Osborne, 129 S.
Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009) (writing a five to four opinion denying defendant’s constitutional right to
obtain state’s DNA evidence in postconviction proceeding); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
695, 704 (2009) (writing a five to four opinion holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable
when an unlawful search is due to isolated police negligence); Medellin v. Tex., 552 U.S. 491,
532 (2008) (holding a treaty non-self-executing and holding that a presidential order transcended
presidential power); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–410 (2007) (writing a five to four
opinion upholding school officials who confiscated pro-drug banner against First Amendment
claim). See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (writing dissent in a five to four
decision striking down a regime for considering detainment of alien enemy combatants).
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in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.242 Roberts assigned
himself the opinion for the Court although Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger243
must have signaled that any opinion Roberts wrote would probably only speak for four Justices
on some points. Yet presumably Roberts thought himself best able to write an opinion that would
command at least four votes in support of a rationale adverse to virtually any racial
classifications . More surprising were the arguments he used to portray Brown as reflecting an
anticlassificationist vision of the Equal Protection Clause and his insistence that the attorneys for
the black school children shared that vision, an argument that depended on a selective citation of
sources read out of their historical context.244
In a number of important cases, Roberts has been unable to craft an opinion that would
commit five Justices to a common rationale.245 On the other hand, consensus may have been
impossible due to the ideological commitments of some Justices. In that case, the plurality
242

551 U.S. at 797–798.

243

539 U.S. 306, 343–344 (concluding that diversity was a compelling interest and endorsing

Justice Powell’s approach in Bakke).
244

Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s

Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 791, 797 (2008); Snyder, supra n. 230, at 1237.
245

See e.g. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62–63 (2008) (upholding Kentucky’s lethal injection

protocol with only Justices Kennedy and Alito joining in the opinion); Parents Involved, 551
U.S. at 797–798 (finding diversity to be a compelling interest and allowing some consideration
of race in student assignments); Fed. Election Commn. v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 503–
504 (2007) (Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas arguing for broader ruling overturning
precedent and striking down statute).
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opinions may reflect the intractability of the challenge rather than any failure on Roberts’ part,
and his willingness to undertake the assignment may be evidence of institutional commitment.
In addition to the attributes sketched above, Roberts has at least two other advantages that
could greatly enhance his prospects of becoming a great Chief Justice. First, he is an extremely
effective and telegenic verbal communicator. His performance during his confirmation hearings
was simply awesome and attracted widespread praise.246 Although twenty-two senators, all
Democrats, voted against Roberts’ confirmation, he attracted far greater cross-party support, and
accordingly far fewer negative votes, than any other recent nominee.247 Roberts won support
246

See e.g. Michael Fletcher, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, The Washington Post

(Sept. 30, 2005) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.html) (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ confirmation hearing
was almost flawless).
247

Roberts was confirmed seventy-eight to twenty-two on September 29, 2005. U.S. Sen., U.S.

Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress - 1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=1&vote=00245 (accessed Jan. 22,
2011). Alito, by comparison, was confirmed fifty-eight to forty-two on January 31, 2006, only
four months later by the same Senate. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress - 2nd
Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/
roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2&vote=00002 (accessed Jan. 22, 2011). Sonia
Sotomayor was confirmed sixty-eight to thrity-one on August 6, 2009. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate
Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00262 (accessed Jan. 22,
2011). Sotomayor’s nine Republican votes included four who had announced their retirement. Id.
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from fifty-one percent of opposing party senators, a far better showing than other Supreme Court
nominees in the last five years. Surely his evident talent and his ability to project a comforting
judicial disposition persuaded many Democrats to support him, in part by making that a position
their constituents would accept or embrace.
CONFIRMATION HEARING VOTES RECEIVED
Opposing Party Votes

% of Opposing Party Votes Received

Roberts

23

51%

Alito

4

9%

Sotomayor

9

22.5%

Kagan

5

12.5%

Roberts’ assets as a television performer coincide with technological change that may add
value to those skills. Most of his predecessors served before the advent of C-Span gave the Court
much prospect of substantial air time.248 To date, Roberts has maintained a relatively low
profile.249 Nonetheless, in his public appearances and interviews, Roberts presents himself as a
Elana Kagan was confirmed sixty-three to thirty-seven a year later, on August 5, 2010. U.S. Sen.,
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress – 2nd Session, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=2&vote=00229
(accessed Jan. 22, 2011).
248

See Bruce Collins, C-Span’s Long and Winding Road to a Still Un-Ttelevised Supreme Court,

106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 12, 12–13 (describing C-Span’s coverage of the Supreme
Court and its members).
249

See e.g. Pew Research Ctr., The Databank, 8% - Chief Justice Thurgood Marshall?

http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1056 (accessed Jan. 22, 2011)
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likeable figure who communicates in an effective manner. Roberts’ skill as a public and visible
communicator is an asset that can enhance his, and the Court’s, public stature and develop
support for its jurisprudence.
Second, Roberts is likely to serve as Chief Justice for a long, long time. Earl Warren was
sixty-two years old when Eisenhower nominated him as Chief Justice. When Roberts reaches
sixty-two, he will have served longer than Hughes did as Chief Justice. When Roberts reaches
sixty-seven, Hughes’ age when appointed, he will have served longer than Warren did. If
Roberts serves until the age at which Hughes (seventy-nine) or Burger (seventy-nine) retired or
Rehnquist (eighty) died, he will have essentially served longer than any Chief Justice except
Marshall.250
Roberts will no doubt encounter unanticipated circumstances. His opportunities to
persuade may be limited if the Court remains ideologically divided and, in such a context, his

(reporting that twenty-eight percent could identify Roberts as Chief Justice, compared to fortythree percent who correctly identified Rehnquist in November 1986).
250

Roger Taney, the Chief Justice with the second-longest tenure, took office only days before

his fifty-ninth birthday, served twenty-eight and a half years until he was eighty-seven. Abraham,
supra note 1, at Roberts would pass Taney in length of service in spring 2034, a few months
past his seventy-ninth birthday. Fletcher, supra n. 246 (noting that Roberts was fifty when he
became Chief Justice in 2005). Burger retired a few days after turning seventy-nine; Hughes did
so less than three months after reaching that milestone. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 8, 10; Pusey, supra
n. 25, at 786–787. Warren retired three months after his seventy-eighth birthday; at that age,
Roberts will be about a year short of Taney’s service. Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 7, 764.
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chance to lead may depend on which side of the divide he is on and whether he has colleagues
who are amenable to persuasion in high-profile cases.
Yet his anticipated tenure provides Roberts with unique opportunities. Like Hughes,
Warren, and Rehnquist, he is likely to experience several different Roberts Courts as different
presidents replace senior colleagues, a process that has already begun. In all likelihood, he will
serve with Court configurations which will provide a variety of leadership challenges and
opportunities. The luxury of time allows Roberts to be patient in cases where he is not
immediately able to achieve his jurisprudential goals. For a protracted period, Roberts will
probably initiate and direct conference discussions, assign most Court opinions, and have the
opportunity to foster an environment conducive to the sort of leadership a Chief Justice can
provide. For many, he will become the face of one branch of American government, and his
image may define the judiciary for a long time.
V.

Conclusion

“A Chief Justice,” Philip Kurland wrote, “despite the public image, has little authority
that is not shared by his colleagues on the Court, except that which inheres in his personal
capacities.”251 Yet what “inheres in his personal capacities” channeled through the few formal
powers attached to his office has allowed some Chief Justices to lead the Court whereas others
have simply held the title.252 Speaking in 1928, Charles Evans Hughes commented that John
Marshall’s “preeminence was due to the fact that he was John Marshall, not simply that he was
Chief Justice; the combination of John Marshall and the Chief Justiceship has given us our most

251

Kurland, supra n. 209, at 354.

252

Id.
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illustrious judicial figure.”253 Being Charles Evans Hughes or Earl Warren may also furnish a
head start.
Although the formal powers of the Chief Justice are limited, the manner in which they are
deployed will affect the way in which the Court operates and the manner in which history recalls
the Chief Justice. Recent history provides no single prescription for success in the role. Each
Chief Justice operates in a different context, which will shape opportunities for leadership and
the appropriate strategies. Ultimately, the success of a Chief Justice depends upon the manner in
which he or she discharges his or her professional responsibilities and exercises interpersonal
skill, and his or her capacity for leadership in the context presented.
John Roberts may not be John Marshall or Charles Evans Hughes or Earl Warren. Who
is? That does not mean he will not emerge as a very consequential Chief Justice. Whether he
does will depend on his ability to marshal his professional and personal resources, to adapt to the
context circumstances present, and to deploy his formidable assets in service of a mission that
history recognizes as enhancing the rule of law.
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Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 58 (Columbia U. Press 1928).
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LEADING THE COURT: STUDIES IN
INFLUENCE AS CHIEF JUSTICE
Joel K. Goldstein*
John G. Roberts, Jr. has now served more than five years as
the seventeenth Chief Justice of the United States. He has held
that position longer than Harlan Fiske Stone did and for nearly
twice as many days as John F. Kennedy was President.
Although Chief Justice Roberts’ judicial opinions, and those
of the Court, offer jurisprudence to analyze, it is too early to reach
definitive judgments regarding his influence as Chief Justice or
his success in that position. Roberts holds an office that, unique
among high governmental positions, resists confident real-time
assessment.
The office of Chief Justice is cloaked in ambiguity and mystery. Most of what the Chief does publicly either resembles the
work of the Associate Justices (i.e., opinion writing), involves
administration of the federal judiciary, or seems ceremonial. The
Chief’s administrative work may contribute importantly to the
functioning of the judiciary,1 yet these labors do not provide the
* © 2011, Joel K. Goldstein. All rights reserved. Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law,
Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful to other participants at the Constitutional Law Discussion Forum at the University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of
Law on December 15–16, 2010, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, to
the sponsors of that event, and to Russell Weaver and Mark Killenbeck for the invitation
to participate. Stacy Osmond and Margaret McDermott, Esq. provided research assistance.
I alone am responsible for the views and shortcomings of this Article.
1. For instance, William Howard Taft was instrumental in securing passage of the
Judiciary Act of 1925, which made most of the Court’s docket discretionary. Robert J.
Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court 184–185 (U. S.C. Press 1986).
See also Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S. Supreme
Court Appointments from Washington to Bush II 238–239 (5th ed., Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc. 2008) (describing Warren Burger’s administrative achievements); Earl M.
Maltz, The Chief Justiceship of Warren Burger, 1969–1986, at 10–11 (U. S.C. Press 2000)
(also describing the administrative achievements of Warren Burger); Sandra Day
O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice 141–145 (Random House 2003) (discussing the initial skepticism that greeted Burger’s administrative
reforms); Steamer, supra n. 1 at 187–192 (discussing the administrative reforms of Chief
Justice Burger); see generally Alan B. Morrison & D. Scott Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of
the United States: More Than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, 1 Const. Commentary 57
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usual measure for assessing his or her contributions. Instead, history typically evaluates Chief Justices based largely on their
perceived impact on the Court’s institutional standing and on its
decisions and opinions, particularly those regarding constitutional interpretation. Yet measuring that influence is difficult.
The formal powers of the Chief Justice regarding the Court’s
work are few—presiding at conference and assigning opinions
when in the majority—and the linkage between a Chief’s action
and historic effect is often inscrutable. Most of the activities that
may significantly and distinctively affect the Court’s work occur
behind closed doors, obscured from the view of all but a few
observers. Those who witness it, primarily the other Justices,
generally maintain a discrete silence, at least while the Chief presides, other than tossing occasional public praise his or her way.
The necessary customs of a small, collegial judicial institution
may mandate these characteristics of invisible interactions and
contemporary confidentiality, but those habits postpone informed
judgment by denying outside observers critical information.
Though these attributes characterize the Supreme Court generally, the Roberts Court presents some additional impediments to
assessment. It has experienced a high degree of turnover with
four new members, including the Chief, in five years.2 That
amount of transition in personnel imposes new challenges for
many members, including the Chief. New members must become
acclimated to the Court’s work, practices, and personalities; continuing Justices must familiarize themselves with colleagues who
have different attitudes, experiences, and styles than their predecessors. The new members include a new Chief Justice who many
had previously experienced as an advocate or lower court judge.
The retirements of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, David Souter,
and John Paul Stevens necessarily impacted the group dynamic
by removing some powerful personalities from the institutional
mix. Turnover also puts some members in new roles. Justice
Anthony Kennedy now is senior to all but the Chief Justice and
Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Stevens’ retirement means that
(1994) (discussing the nonjudicial responsibilities of Chief Justice); Steamer, supra n. 1, at
16 (arguing that Taft’s term saw the Chief Justice become the head of the judiciary rather
than simply the presiding officer of the Court).
2. S. Ct. of the U.S., Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www
.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (accessed Apr. 12, 2011).
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Justice Kennedy gets to assign the opinion when he joins the four
‚liberal‛ Justices. These changes mark the Court as an institution
currently in flux. Some time is needed before the Justices adjust
to a changed context and before the component parts arrange
themselves in discernible and predictable patterns.
Moreover, Roberts’ youth when appointed—he was fifty—
raises the prospect that these first five years may be but a fragment of a tenure that could rival in length Chief Justice John
Marshall’s thirty-four-year run. Even if Roberts does not match
that record, life tenure and the actuarial tables would predict that
his service will substantially exceed the seventeen-year average of
his three most recent predecessors. Thus, Roberts may still be in
the early moments of his tenure, a possibility that carries two
significant consequences that, taken together, present a historical
dilemma. The likely longevity of his term may allow him to exert
a relatively unique impact on the Court and on American law.
Nonetheless, much information regarding his leadership may
remain hidden for some time, until his colleagues are willing to
speak frankly and until his papers and those of other Justices are
made available for scholars to assess. The history of his Chief
Justiceship is being made, yet the history of his leadership will
not be heard,3 at least for a while.
Even though circumstances will defer informed assessments
of Roberts’ impact, the patterns of the recent past may provide
some useful analytical tools to help anticipate the likelihood that
Roberts will exert influence as Chief Justice and the ways he
might do so. Although the Chief Justice has ‚scant inherent powers‛4 and some suggest his office carries ‚no more authority than
other members of the [C]ourt,‛5 anecdotal evidence suggests that
a Chief can make a substantial difference, in discrete cases and in
3. Cf. Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
705 (2007) (Roberts himself wrote, ‚When it comes to using race to assign children to
schools, history will be heard.‛).
4. Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 192 (Simon & Schuster 1965).
5. Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 246 (Oxford U. Press 1993). See
also Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 Va. L. Rev. 883, 901 (1953) (stating that ‚[a]side from the power to assign the writing of opinions . . . a Chief Justice has no
authority that any other member of the Court has[ no]t‛ and that the Court, was really ‚an
institution in which every man is his own sovereign. The Chief Justice is primus inter
pares.‛).
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the overall operation of the Court.6 Historically, informed governmental observers have cared deeply who becomes Chief
Justice, and their behavior provides some evidence that the office
is consequential.7
Some consensus suggests that during the last century, there
have been at least two great Chiefs—Charles Evans Hughes and
Earl Warren8—although some would add a third, William Howard
Taft, as ‚near great.‛9 At least three other Chief Justices—Harlan
Fiske Stone, Fred Vinson, and Warren Burger— are regarded as
rather unsuccessful measured by their leadership of the Court’s
decisionmaking efforts.10
6. E.g. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 899–902.
7. When Chief Justice Fuller died on July 4, 1910, several members of the Court
wanted to succeed him and significant lobbying occurred before President Taft nominated
Justice Edward White. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 133–134. When Chief Justice White died
on May 19, 1921, Taft became Chief Justice. Id. at 135. This was after making clear that
he would not accept appointment as an Associate Justice and after having previously
declined such appointments. Mason, supra n. 4, at 17. When Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone died on April 22, 1946, some Justices reportedly sent word to President Truman that
they would resign if Justice Robert Jackson became Chief Justice. Edwin M. Yoder, Jr.,
Black v. Jackson: A Study in Judicial Enmity, in The Unmaking of a Whig 3, 5–6 (Geo. U.
Press 1990). When President Truman instead nominated Fred Vinson, Justice Jackson
sent an unprecedented cable to two congressional committee chairs blasting Justice Hugo
Black who he suspected of undermining his prospects for elevation. Id. at 45–46. Presidents care, too. President Taft stewed over the appointment in 1910, as did President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, and President Truman in 1946. President Lyndon B. Johnson so wanted to elevate his friend, Justice Abe Fortas, that he ignored warning signs that
such an appointment would receive a hostile reception. And senators place great stock in
who occupies the center chair. Republicans and Southern Democrats invested considerable
energies in successfully filibustering Justice Fortas’ promotion even though it would not
change the Court’s composition. When President Ronald Reagan nominated Justice
William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice, Senate Democrats focused on contesting his nomination but essentially ignored that of then Judge Antonin Scalia who President Reagan
had nominated for Justice Rehnquist’s seat even though Justice Rehnquist’s elevation
would not change the composition of the Court, whereas Scalia’s confirmation would.
8. See Abraham, supra n. 1, at 5–7, 158, 203 (discussing previous evaluations of the
greatness of a Chief Justice, and recognizing Hughes as ‚great‛ and Warren as ‚[C]hief
[J]ustice par excellence‛); Steamer, supra n. 1, at 36 (identifying Hughes and Warren,
along with John Marshall, as great Chief Justices); Abe Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The
Enigma of Leadership, 84 Yale L.J. 405, 405–406 (1975) (describing Marshall and Hughes’
leadership as ‚outstanding‛ and stating that Warren should be included in that ‚special
category‛).
9. See Abraham, supra n. 1, at 147 (arguing that Taft was not a great Chief Justice
despite his administrative and technical leadership, but was considered ‚near great‛);
Mason, supra n. 4, at 304 (observing that Taft was not commonly regarded as a great Chief
Justice). Some would argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist was ‚great,‛ but it is too soon to
reach that judgment. See infra pt. I(D) for a discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
10. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 11 (arguing that Burger was not a distinguished Chief Justice
based on his role in jurisprudential leadership); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice
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The modest, some might say meager, formal powers of a Chief
Justice may allow, but certainly do not guarantee, judicial leadership.11 Whether a Chief leads, and leads well, depends on his or
her capacity to exploit the opportunities the powers provide. This
ability turns on his or her possession of intangible qualities,
which are unevenly distributed among those who occupy the center chair. Between his two stints on the Court (at a time when he
presumably thought his chance to be Chief Justice had passed),
Hughes wrote that the Chief’s ‚actual influence will depend upon
the strength of his character and the demonstration of his ability
in the intimate relations of the judges.‛12 Professor David Danelski essentially echoed this conclusion in an important article a
half century ago; he concluded that a Chief Justice’s ‚actual influence depends upon his esteem, ability, and personality and how
he performs his various roles.‛13
This Hughes–Danelski assessment seems clearly correct. Yet
the experiences of Chief Justices during the last century suggest
two refinements. First, there is no one model of background or
conduct that predicts greatness as a Chief Justice. The traits that
seem to correlate well with success as Chief Justice are intangible
qualities of leadership, not any characteristics that lend themselves to easy measurement. Second, the influence of a Chief
Justice inevitably depends on contextual factors as well as on personal attributes. Whether a Chief Justice can lead, and how,
depends on the opportunities history provides, and those vary
from Chief to Chief and often during any one incumbency.
Part I of this Article will outline the thesis of Danelski’s 1960
article and apply it to the seven Chief Justices from Taft to Rehnquist. Relying on these sketches, Part II will discuss the impact of
context on the Chief’s influence. Part III will suggest that tangible qualities and particular practices do not correlate well with
of the United States: Primus Inter Pares, 17 J. Pub. L. 20, 20 (1968) (stating that Stone
‚suffered from administrative ineptitude‛); see generally Abraham, supra n. 1, at 183–184,
191, 239 (discussing Stone’s ‚less [than] satisfactory‛ role as Chief Justice, Vinson’s ‚lack
of leadership,‛ and Burger’s ‚marginally successful attempts‛ to shift the judicial position).
11. David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in
Walter F. Murphy et al., Courts, Judges & Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process
675, 676 (6th ed., McGraw-Hill 2006) (stating that the office of Chief Justice ‚does not
guarantee leadership‛).
12. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Foundation,
Methods and Achievements: An Interpretation 57 (Garden City Publg. Co. 1936).
13. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 676.
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success as Chief Justice. Part IV will apply some of these generalizations to Roberts before Part V offers conclusions.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE IN
THE DECISIONAL PROCESS
A. The Danelski Formulation
Fifty years ago, David J. Danelski published a short study of
the Chief Justice’s influence in the Court’s decisionmaking
process based on his review of Court papers during the Taft,
Hughes, and Stone Chief Justiceships. He identified task and
social leadership as two distinct activities that contributed to the
success and cohesion of the Court.14 The former role focused on
the Court’s work to reach a decision whereas the latter emphasized the need of the members of the institution to remain
sufficiently cohesive, socially, to accomplish its work. The Chief’s
success in performing those roles is not assured but is contingent
on his or her mix of skills as perceived by his or her colleagues,
his or her ‚esteem, ability, and personality and how he [or she]
performs his [or her] various roles.‛15
Danelski suggested that the Chief Justice, as the presiding
officer at the conference, was in a favorable but not inevitable
position to exert both ‚task and social leadership.‛16 The Chief
Justice typically presented the cases to the conference, which
Danelski regarded as ‚an important task function.‛17 Although
Danelski did not spell out the advantages associated with case
presentation, presumably that function allows the Chief to frame
the issues, a prerogative that may effectively steer discussion in a
particular direction. Moreover, the right to be the first to state a
position affords the Chief the opportunity to suggest a resolution
before anyone else has verbally committed. Thus, presumably, the
order of speaking at conference gives the Chief persuading advantages over those who get to weigh in only after others have
already stated their views. Minds can and do change but most are
more persuadable before, not after, they have shared a conclusion.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the assignment power that the Chief exercises when in
the majority confers substantial opportunity to shape the doctrine
that will emerge from the decision.
Danelski pointed out that presiding at conference also positioned the Chief to exercise critical social functions. He was in
position ‚to invite suggestions and opinions, seek compromises,
and cut off debate [that] appears to be getting out of hand.‛18 His
ability to engage his colleagues yet manage their interaction could
contribute to the Court’s cohesion, or lack thereof.
Danelski also explored the importance of the opinionassigning role, which falls to the Chief when he or she is part of
the majority. That function presented four instrumental challenges: producing a valuable precedent, winning public
acceptance for a decision, preserving a majority when the Court
was divided, and massing the Court.
Finally, Danelski concluded that unifying the Court was
among the Chief’s ‚most important roles.‛19 Quite clearly, the
Chief’s skill as a task and social leader and in assigning opinions
would contribute to his or her success in this role. So, too, would
the extent to which he or she emphasized unanimity as a judicial
norm.
B. Successful Chief Justices
1. Charles Evans Hughes
Hughes’ great success as Chief Justice related in part to his
ability to merge the roles of task and social leader. Danelski proclaimed Hughes ‚the most esteemed member of his Court‛ in
large part due to his commanding performance at conference.20
Hughes’ work won the respect of his colleagues. ‚Few men have
been so fitted by talent and disposition to carry the heavy burden
which unavoidably rests on the Chief Justice,‛ wrote Stone.21 ‚He

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 681.
Danelski, supra n. 11, at 677.
Harlan F. Stone, The Chief Justice, 27 ABA J. 407, 407 (July 1941).
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was master of the business,‛ said Frankfurter,22 who likened
Hughes presiding to Toscanini conducting.23
The Chief Justice’s case-stating prerogative probably contributed to Hughes’ influence even more than it enhanced that of his
predecessors or successors. By all accounts, Hughes was an outstanding lawyer with a keen analytical mind and a formidable
memory. He labored over case files until he had mastered them.
At conference, he stated cases succinctly yet comprehensively,
precisely, and impartially.24 The case having been presented, he
concluded by offering his preferred resolution, and his statements
of proposed dispositions often commanded assent.25 After listening
to discussion, Hughes then summarized the Court’s position and
reacted to the comments of the other Justices.26
In addition to Hughes’ task leadership, Danelski regarded
him as the social leader of the Court who acted to ensure its cohesion.27 Hughes was not a backslapping extrovert but maintained
warm relations with his brethren, some of whom he had known
for years before becoming Chief Justice.28 Hughes was sensitive to
22. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 901.
23. Id.; see also Felix Frankfurter, “The Administrative Side” of Chief Justice Hughes,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1949) (‚He knew that the manner of conducting the business of the
Court affects the matter. . . . In Court and in conference he struck the pitch, as it were, for
the orchestra.‛).
24. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes vol. 2, 664–665, 673–674 (Macmillan Co.
1951); Owen J. Roberts, Charles Evans Hughes: The Administrative Master in Alan F.
Westin, An Autobiography of the Supreme Court 205, 208 (Greenwood Press 1978); Stone,
supra n. 21 , at 407 (referring to Hughes’ ‚extraordinary power of accurate and luminous
statement‛); Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief
Justice Hughes, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 14–15, 17 (1949) (discussing Hughes’ skill in stating
cases and his elaborate preparation for conference); Transcriptions of Conversations
Between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 1:
December 20, 1961, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas1.html
(accessed Apr. 13, 2011) (‚Hughes covered all those in a very, very efficient way. One of the
reasons that he did that was, first, he had tremendous capacity, an unusual capacity to get
things done very fast.‛).
25. Roberts, supra n. 24, at 208.
26. Id.; Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 40
(1967).
27. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 677.
28. Chief Justice Hughes had served with Justices Holmes, Van Devanter, and
McReynolds during his first stint on the Court. The Autobiographical Notes of Charles
Evans Hughes 298 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., Harv. U. Press 1973).
Hughes maintained warm relations with them, even with the incorrigible McReynolds,
who reportedly deferred to him. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 667–668, 670–671. Hughes was
particularly friendly with Van Devanter from their prior service. William G. Ross, The
Chief Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes, 1930–1941, at 19 (U. S.C. Press 2007). Hughes
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the personalities and psychic needs of his colleagues, and he presided with tact. Hughes treated his colleagues in a courteous
manner and did not let jurisprudential disagreements affect his
interactions with them.29
Hughes’ command in conference was no doubt enhanced by
his behavior toward the other Justices outside of it. When Justice
Van Devanter fell behind in his opinions, Hughes would sometimes reclaim some assigned cases, but always with the comment
that Van Devanter had been overburdened.30 The anti-Semitic
McReynolds avoided social encounters with Louis Brandeis, so
Hughes divided his colleagues between two annual dinners he
hosted.31 Hughes developed and maintained a close rapport with
Owen Roberts,32 and when Roberts was hospitalized for three
weeks, Hughes visited him every weekday.33 Knowing that Cardozo would immediately begin working on an opinion on Saturday
night if he received an assignment after the conference, Hughes
withheld Cardozo’s allotment until Sunday or Monday to protect
his health.34 So Cardozo would not feel singled out, Hughes also
deferred sending assignments to Van Devanter, Cardozo’s neighbor.35 He handled the delicate mission of suggesting to Holmes
that it was time for the ninety-year-old to retire with such tact
that Holmes immediately took the hint free of ill feeling.36 Hugo
Black had voted against Hughes’ nomination as Chief Justice and
had advocated the court-packing plan; yet, Hughes treated him
with such courtesy and respect that Black became an admirer.37

and Justice Brandeis had overlapped for only a few days in June 1916, but they had
known each other as practicing lawyers and had a warm relationship. Danelski & Tulchin,
supra n. 28, at 171, 298. Hughes and Justice Cardozo were old friends long before President Hoover nominated Cardozo to succeed Justice Holmes. Id. at 299–300; Pusey, supra
n. 24, at 682. Hughes had served in President Herbert Hoover’s Cabinet with Harlan Fiske
Stone. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 298. Brandeis and McReynolds, representing
opposite wings of the Court, both endorsed Hughes’ nomination. Ross, supra n. 28, at 19–
20.
29. Ross, supra n. 28, at 28, 219.
30. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 667–668.
31. Id. at 670.
32. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 298.
33. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 669.
34. William O. Douglas, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 549, 549 (1960).
35. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 678.
36. Id. at 681–682.
37. Id. at 773.
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Hughes never lobbied other Justices outside of the conference
room although he was open to discussing a case if approached.38
Hughes facilitated the Court’s work and generally won points
with his colleagues by his efficient administration. He conducted
Court business in a manner that was respectful of his colleagues’
calendars. Conferences began on schedule, and Hughes enforced
the time allotted to oral advocates (it was said, perhaps apocryphally, that he once cut an advocate off in the middle of the word
‚if‛) and was not afraid to end oral argument when no longer
needed. Hughes typically circulated a list of cases he deemed
unworthy of certiorari.39 Although it was understood that any of
the cases would be discussed at the request of a single Justice,
such requests came about once every other year of Hughes’ Chief
Justiceship.40
Hughes put a good deal of thought into case assignments,
which he considered his ‚most delicate task.‛41 Although Hughes
claimed that he tried to distribute important cases equally,42 he
was not averse to keeping a disproportionate number for himself
(twenty-eight percent), a smaller percentage than Taft retained
(thirty-four percent) but far more than did Stone (eleven percent).43 He kept some important opinions for himself but also
shouldered his share of the pedestrian cases.44 He often assigned
controversial cases to the Justice close to the Court’s center to
38. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 301; Pusey, supra n. 24, at 676–677; Roberts,
supra n. 24, at 209–210 (stating that Hughes never discussed merits of cases with other
Justices between argument and conference).
39. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 672.
40. Id. Hughes’ efficient approach did not meet with universal acclaim. Stone thought
Hughes ran conference like a ‚drill sergeant.‛ Ross, supra n. 28, at 221. This left inadequate time for collective rumination of matters before the Court. Barry Cushman,
Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 101–103
(Oxford U. Press 1998). Stone tried to fill this gap by sometimes holding Friday afternoon
rump sessions, which a few Justices attended. Ross, supra n. 28, at 222; Melvin I. Urofsky,
Division and Discord: The Supreme Court under Stone and Vinson, 1941–1953, at 31 (U.
S.C. Press 1997).
41. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 302; see also Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 904
(‚No Chief Justice, I believe, equaled Chief Justice Hughes in the skill and the wisdom and
the disinterestedness with which he made his assignments.‛).
42. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 302.
43. David M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 260 (7th
ed., W.W. Norton 2005). To some extent, these numbers may reflect the Chief picking up
the slack for ill or less productive colleagues, as was true of Taft, for instance. See Ross,
supra n. 28, at 230 (listing significant cases Hughes assigned himself).
44. Roberts, supra n. 24, at 209.
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minimize division.45 He tended to assign each Justice a range of
cases46 while considering the ‚special fitness of a Justice for writing in the particular case.‛47
Finally, Hughes worked to achieve a consensus as broad as
the Court’s composition allowed. In part, he led by example. He
rarely wrote dissenting opinions, and his institutional commitment often caused him to acquiesce silently in a disposition rather
than publish his disagreement.48
Hughes quite clearly commanded the admiration of the
Brethren, many of whom effusively praised his leadership. Frankfurter said that Hughes ‚radiated authority, not through any
other quality than the intrinsic moral power that was his.‛49
Douglas regarded Hughes as ‚a great man.‛50 So, too, did those
who observed Hughes in action. Robert Jackson wrote of Hughes’
‚impressive personality‛ and said he ‚imparted strength to the
Court during our time by his character.‛51 Paul Freund, who
encountered Hughes as a law clerk to Brandeis, as an attorney
before the Court, and as a scholar, compared Hughes to John
Marshall as a Chief Justice.52
2. Earl Warren
Warren lacked Hughes’ technical skill as a lawyer yet apparently presided with welcome authority.53 His popularity among
his colleagues disposed them in his favor, and he apparently provided able case summaries that highlighted the basic issues for
decision followed with a clear statement of his position, except in
an occasional technical matter in which he indicated he would
45. Freund, supra n. 26, at 40.
46. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 678; Ross, supra n. 28, at 229.
47. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 302.
48. Freund, supra n. 26, at 37–38 (reporting that Hughes wrote only seventeen dissents and six concurrences out of more than two hundred and fifty opinions).
49. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 901.
50. Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor
Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 7a: January 18, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/
finding_aids/douglas/douglas7a.html (accessed Apr. 13, 2011).
51. Robert H. Jackson, The Judicial Career of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in
The Supreme Court and Its Justices 142–143 (Jesse H. Choper ed., 2d ed., ABA 2001).
52. Freund, supra n. 26, at 43.
53. Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953–1969, at 22–23
(U. S.C. Press 2005) (quoting Justice Stewart that Warren was ‚ideal‛ in presiding over
the conference).
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join any majority for lack of his own preference.54 Warren reportedly presided in a fair and efficient manner and resisted the urge
to argue with his colleagues, a practice that had undermined
Stone’s authority.55 Warren’s colleagues regarded him as persuasive in conference and a hard worker.56 He drew on the skill of
others to enhance his own performance. Warren and Black often
discussed pending cases before and after conferences.57 After
Brennan joined the Court, Warren regularly strategized with
him, meeting every Thursday before conference in Brennan’s
chambers.58
Warren reportedly provided simple, but effective, statements
of cases that focused discussion on the underlying moral values at
issue. Warren’s eloquent statement at the December 12, 1953 conference on Brown v. Board of Education59 was noteworthy in this
respect.60 Although Warren said he favored ‚pooling all of the
humble wisdom of the Court[,]‛ he proceeded to state that ‚separate but equal‛ rested on the ‚basic premise that the Negro race is
inferior,‛ a conclusion Warren rejected as inconsistent with the
three Civil War Amendments.61 Warren’s comments, when
coupled with the prior term’s discussion of the case, signaled that
a clear majority existed to overturn Plessy and placed the constitutional issue in a moral frame that virtually compelled the
ultimate decision.62 Moreover, Warren astutely invited the confer54. Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court—A Judicial
Biography 143–144 (N.Y.U. Press 1983).
55. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Chief Justice Warren, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1974)
(praising Warren’s skills presiding over conference); Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 144 (stating
that Warren would rarely contradict others at conference, and allowed each Justice their
full say).
56. Interview by T. H. Baker with Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. (July 10,
1969) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/
oralhistory.hom/MarshallT/marshall.pdf) [hereinafter Marshall Interview].
57. Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made 348 (Penguin
Group 2006).
58. Seth Stern & Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 106, 183, 250–
252 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2010); Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. Times 6
(Oct. 5, 1986).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. Notes of Conference of December 12, 1953, in The Supreme Court in Conference:
1940–1985, at 654 (Del Dickson ed., Oxford U. Press 2001) [hereinafter The Supreme Court
in Conference].
61. Id.
62. See e.g. G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 165 (Oxford U. Press 1982)
(arguing that Warren’s statement used moral shame to attract support).
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ence to discuss, but not to vote on, the case to make it easier for
those with misgivings about overturning Plessy to change their
minds later.63 Although Warren was not solely responsible for
achieving the unanimous result in Brown, he surely played an
important role.64
Brown was by no means the only instance when Warren’s
opening identified a broad principle that the Court adopted. In
Miranda v. Arizona,65 Warren’s conference statement articulated
the basic ideals and specific requirements that later found their
way into his opinion and commanded the essential assent of five
others.66 In Loving v. Virginia,67 he declared that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to eliminate racial discrimination,
but that miscegenation statutes ‚maintain white supremacy.‛68
Bernard Schwartz found from his review of conference notes that
Warren was usually able to lead the Court in the direction he
chose.69
Warren also excelled as a social leader, and his popularity
with his colleagues presumably enhanced his influence. He had
immense interpersonal skills. The simple acts of a master politician paid important dividends. When Warren first arrived at the
Court, he went directly to Black’s chambers and introduced himself to Black’s office staff and law clerks—a gesture Black
appreciated.70 He asked Black for a reading list to help with opinion writing, and after Black suggested Aristotle’s Rhetoric,
Warren immediately began to read it.71 He invited Black, as
senior Justice, to continue to preside at conference initially. Warren greeted Potter Stewart and his wife at the train station at
63. Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor
Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 13: December 17, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/
finding_aids/douglas/douglas13.html (accessed Apr. 13, 2011).
64. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the
Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (1979) (describing how the role of the Court’s
previous unanimous decisions on issues of racial segregation started a trend that helped
bring about the unanimity in Brown).
65. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 60, at 515–518.
67. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
68. The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 60, at 695.
69. Bernard Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action 12
(Addison-Wesley 1990); see also Belknap, supra n. 53, at 22 (stating that Warren could
usually steer conference discussion).
70. Newton, supra n. 57, at 277.
71. Id. at 277–278.
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6:30 a.m. when they first arrived in Washington, District
of Columbia.72 Warren routinely met other Justices, even those
most junior, in their chambers rather than summoning them to
his, persisting in the practice even when they protested that protocol demanded that they visit him.73 This show of humility—
institutional and personal—helped endear Warren to his associates. Warren personally hand-delivered his draft of the opinion
in Brown to each of his colleagues, even taking it to Jackson in
the hospital,74 a gesture that signaled deference of a new Chief
Justice for a senior colleague and afforded an opportunity for conversation, in addition to addressing the underlying confidentiality
concerns associated with transporting the opinion outside of the
Court. Warren won favor with other actions too, like lobbying
Congress (unsuccessfully) to provide cars and drivers for the Justices75 or resisting efforts to increase the differential between his
salary and that of the Associate Justices from five hundred dollars to twenty-five hundred dollars.76
Warren also cultivated his colleagues socially—an enterprise
that must have come naturally for someone Brennan recalled as
being ‚marvelous with people.‛77 Warren and his family spent holidays with the Blacks; he hunted78 and walked79 with Clark; and
he attended sporting events and otherwise regularly socialized
with Brennan.80 He persuaded all of his colleagues (except Black
and Frankfurter) to join him at the Army-Navy football game
most years; the Justices traveled to the game by rail during which
time they socialized with one another and their families over
breakfast and dinner.81
Save for Frankfurter and sometimes Douglas, Warren’s colleagues spoke of him effusively.82 Brennan regarded him as ‚the
72. Belknap, supra n. 53, at 21; Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 321.
73. See generally Leeds, supra n. 58 (citing Warren’s practice of meeting Brennan in
his chambers as a reflection of Warren’s view that he was ‚Chief among equals‛).
74. Hutchinson, supra n. 64, at 42.
75. Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 347–348 (Doubleday & Co. 1977).
76. Brennan, supra n. 55, at 3.
77. Leeds, supra n. 58.
78. Newton, supra n. 57, at 348.
79. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 443.
80. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 105; Leeds, supra n. 58.
81. Newton, supra n. 57, at 350; Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 104–105.
82. The Douglas Letters 124–125 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., Adler & Adler 1987) (criticizing Warren in letters in spring, 1961); Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice
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Super-Chief.‛83 Stewart called Warren ‚an instinctive leader
whom you respected and for whom you had an affection.‛84 Clark
thought Warren would be viewed as the equal to, or greater than,
John Marshall;85 Douglas ranked him with Marshall and
Hughes.86 Marshall described Warren as ‚one of the greatest
people who ever lived‛ and thought history would rank him
‚probably the greatest Chief Justice who ever lived.‛87 Goldberg
exaggerated only slightly in judging Warren as ‚beloved by all his
brethren.‛88 Fortas said that Warren ‚provided an essence, an
attitude, which set the tone and quality of the Court’s work.‛89
Warren distributed assignments fairly, making an effort to
give all members some opportunity to write important cases.90 As
with other Chief Justices, he wrote many of the historic decisions,
such as Brown, Bolling v. Sharpe,91 Reynolds v. Sims,92 Miranda,
Loving, and Powell v. McCormack.93 Yet he also bore more than
his share of those less coveted.94 He often relied on Brennan to
write delicate opinions or to preserve a precarious coalition, as in
Cooper v. Aaron95 or Baker v. Carr.96 Yet strategic concerns probably dictated the assignments to Clark in Abington v. Schempp,97
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,98 and Mapp v.

William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 11: June 9, 1962, http://
www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas11.html) (accessed Apr. 19, 2011).
83. Brennan, supra n. 55, at 5.
84. Belknap, supra n. 53, at 22.
85. Interview by Joe B. Frantz with Tom Clark, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. (Oct. 7, 1969)
(transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory
.hom/Clark-T/Clark-T.PDF).
86. William O. Douglas, in Earl Warren—A Tribute, 58 Cal. L. Rev. 3, 4 (1970).
87. Marshall Interview, supra n. 56.
88. Arthur J. Goldberg, in Earl Warren—A Tribute, supra n. 86, at 6.
89. Fortas, supra n. 8, at 411.
90. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 30; Interview by Joe B. Frantz with Earl Warren, (Sept.
21, 1971) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/
oralhistory.hom/Warren-E/Warren-e.pdf).
91. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
92. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
93. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
94. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 460–461.
95. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Brennan did much of the drafting although the decision was
issued as an opinion of all nine Justices. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 145–152.
96. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 418–419 (discussing strategic
considerations in assignment to Brennan).
97. 347 U.S. 203 (1963).
98. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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Ohio,99 and to Stewart in Katz v. United States100—cases in which
a more conservative author might help keep the majority intact
and gain greater public acceptance.
3. William Howard Taft
The Taft tenure demonstrated that a Chief Justice can, under
certain circumstances, be highly successful without providing
both task and social leadership. Taft, according to Danelski, acted
as the Court’s social leader while his appointee, friend, and ally,
Van Devanter, emerged as the task leader of the conference.101
Taft’s good nature apparently paid dividends in easing tensions
on the Court, and he quickly achieved cordial relations with
Brandeis,102 with whom he had previously endured high-stakes,
public, and acrimonious clashes.103 The rapprochement reflected
their reciprocal efforts, but Taft certainly did his part by going out
of his way to be solicitous about Brandeis’ health and feelings and
accommodating Brandeis’ views and suggestions when he could.
Taft’s outreach was consistent with his ‚very genial‛104 personality, but it also reflected his desire to have the Court work
collegially as a team.105 Taft valued unanimity highly and accordingly tried to foster a climate conducive to compromise.106 The
Taft Court demonstrated a high degree of cohesion, handing down
unanimous decisions eighty-four percent of the time. Taft set an
example in this respect, writing only about two dissents per
year.107

99. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
100. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
101. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 677.
102. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man’s Life 537–539 (Viking Press 1946).
103. Brandeis had humiliated Taft during the investigation of Secretary of Interior
Ballinger in 1910 by demonstrating that Taft had lied in his statements about his own
inquiry into matters in dispute. Six years later, Taft signed a letter along with former
American Bar Association presidents opposing Brandeis’ nomination to the Court on the
grounds that he was unfit to serve. See generally Mason, supra n. 4, at 199–200 (describing
how the two men began to mend relations after this event).
104. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 898 (describing Taft as having ‚great warmth‛ and ‚a
great deal of comraderie [sic] about him‛).
105. See generally Mason, supra n. 4, at 193–206 (describing ways in which Taft promoted teamwork and unanimity).
106. The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 60, at 74–75.
107. O’Connor, supra n. 1, at 116–117.
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Taft won favor with his colleagues generally by generous and
sensitive gestures toward them, ranging from Christmas cards,
rides, and gift salmons, to arranging for the funeral of Mrs.
Holmes at Arlington.108 Taft’s conduct in assigning opinions also
no doubt endeared him to his colleagues. He wrote more than his
share of the Court’s opinions, in part because he assigned himself
cases in areas like patent law, which others preferred to avoid,
and he took on extra work when a colleague was ill or fell
behind.109 Brandeis credited Taft with ‚admirable‛ personal qualities, with smoothing out problems, and with conducting a
harmonious conference.110
Although Taft lacked the legal skills that Hughes was to display, Van Devanter helped fill that void. Van Devanter’s writer’s
block limited his output of opinions,111 but his knowledge of procedure and the Court’s precedents, as well as his ability at legal
analysis were highly valued by his colleagues.112 He often strategized with Taft before conference and reviewed memoranda before
the Chief circulated them to the other chambers.113 Brandeis
claimed that Van Devanter ran the Court due to his knowledge of
federal law and his willingness to be helpful to his colleagues.114
C. Unsuccessful Chief Justices
By contrast, the Chief Justiceships of Stone, Vinson, and
Burger have not been regarded as successful in terms of leading
the Court. The Court fell victim to internecine strife during the
108. Mason, supra n. 4, at 205; see also Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter
Conversations, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 299, 336 (quoting Brandeis as praising Taft’s generosity to
other Justices).
109. Mason, supra n. 4, at 205–206, 231–232 (reporting that Taft wrote one-sixth of the
Court’s opinions and averaged ten opinions per year—more than his colleagues for most
years); Urofsky, supra n. 108, at 321 (crediting Taft with assigning cases fairly).
110. Urofsky, supra n. 108, at 313, 322, 333.
111. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 136; Mason, supra n. 4, at 209 (describing Van Devanter
as ‚‘opinion-shy’‛ and a ‚perfectionist‛); Pusey, supra n. 24, at 667–668 (referring to Van
Devanter’s ‚‘pen paralysis’‛ as ‚almost an affliction‛).
112. David Burner, Willis Van Devanter, in The Justices of the United States Supreme
Court 1789–1978: Their Lives and Major Opinions 1945, 1948, 1952–1953 (Leon Friedman
& Fred L. Israel eds., Chelsea House 1980).
113. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, in The Supreme
Court and Its Justices, supra n. 51, at 319; Mason, supra n. 4, at 222; Alpheus Thomas
Mason, William Howard Taft: President by Chance, Chief Justice by Choice, in The
Supreme Court and Its Justices, supra n. 51, at 139–140.
114. Urofsky, supra n. 108, at 310.
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Chief Justiceships of Stone and Vinson, whom Herbert Johnson
suggests ‚share the unenviable distinction of being perhaps the
least collegial and most internally vindictive periods of the
Court’s history.‛115
1. Harlan Fiske Stone
Although Stone came highly recommended as Chief Justice,116
he proved miscast in the center seat. Stone conducted conference
quite differently than Hughes, in part due to his reaction to
Hughes’ style of leadership, in part because he valued unanimity
less and dissents more, and in part due to his own temperament.
Stone’s praise of Hughes for not seeking ‚unanimity at the cost of
the sacrifice . . . of strongly held convictions‛ and for recognizing
the historic role of dissents117 probably described Stone’s values
more accurately than Hughes’ performance. Stone was more the
academic than the man of action—a jurist whose contributions
came more from his pen than his command.
Stone often came to conference without having reached a resolution of the matters for decision. His statements of cases lacked
the authority of Hughes’ renditions and accordingly others embellished on them and competed for de facto leadership of the Court.
Rather than presiding, he tended to join the debates.118 Believing
Hughes’ efficiency sacrificed full exploration of the issues, Stone
allowed discussion to continue interminably.119 Stone exacerbated
matters by debating with others who differed with his views,120
thereby sacrificing any ability to police the discussions. Whatever
the benefits of longer deliberations, they had negative byprod115. Herbert A. Johnson, Editor’s Preface, in Urofsky, supra n. 40, at ix.
116. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone: Pillar of the Law 566, 570 (The Viking
Press 1956) (reporting praise of Stone from Hughes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter among
others).
117. Stone, supra n. 21, at 408.
118. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 678; Mason, supra n. 116, at 790–792 (describing conferences under Stone); Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas
and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 2: December 20, 1961, http://www.princeton
.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas2.html (accessed Apr. 19, 2011) (describing
Stone’s practice of debating points made by each Justice who spoke).
119. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 902–903.
120. Joseph P. Lash, From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter 152 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1975); Transcripts, supra n. 118 (describing Stone’s practice of debating points made by
each Justice who spoke).
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ucts.121 Disposing of the Court’s work became a more arduous
enterprise as additional sessions were required to complete deliberation. Rather than being Saturday’s work, conferences often
continued on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.122 Moreover,
disagreements between strong-willed members of the Black and
Frankfurter wings of the Court often dominated the discussions
and perhaps exacerbated some of the divisions between the Justices.123 Stone apparently made derogatory comments about
Black, which later became known to Black, thereby tempering his
regard for the Chief Justice.124
2. Fred Vinson
Vinson lacked the legal skill of Hughes or Stone. He was a
sociable person and a number of his colleagues liked him personally.125 That did not translate into professional respect, however,
from colleagues who viewed him as lazy and lackluster.126 Frankfurter’s famous comment at Vinson’s funeral in September 1953
(‚This is the first indication I have ever had that there is a
God.‛),127 may have revealed more about Frankfurter than about
Vinson, yet it reflected a perception that Vinson was more
obstacle than answer in the Court’s effort to find a consensus
solution in the then pending school-segregation cases. Even
Henry Abraham’s effort to present an even-handed judgment concludes that ‚overall, Vinson demonstrated an astonishing lack of
leadership: the role of [C]hief [J]ustice was simply beyond his
ken.‛128 Vinson at times upset colleagues by acting in the more
autocratic manner of a congressional committee chair or cabinet
121. See Mason, supra n. 116, at 793–794 (describing some of the consequences of long
deliberations under Stone’s Chief Justiceship).
122. William O. Douglas, Chief Justice Stone, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 693, 695 (1946).
123. Lash, supra n. 120, at 207, 228; Mason, supra n. 116, at 793–795; O’Brien, supra n.
43, at 197–198; Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 39–40.
124. Transcriptions No. 7a, supra n. 50.
125. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 149; Interview by Jerry N. Hess with Tom C. Clark, Assoc.
J., U.S. S. Ct. (Oct. 17, 1972) (transcript available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/
oralhist/clarktc.htm) (recalling Vinson as popular with other Justices).
126. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 149, 151.
127. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 199; see also Transcriptions of Conversations between
Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No.17: June 5, 1963,
http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas17.html) (describing Vinson
as lacking ‚the elements of greatness‛ of other Chief Justices).
128. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 191.
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official in circumstances when such hierarchical authority did not
reside in the Chief Justice.129 Vinson, though not otherwise a successful Chief Justice, distributed majority opinions evenly and
indeed kept few ‚plums‛ for himself.130 The Court rarely acted
unanimously and dissents proliferated.
3. Warren E. Burger
Burger forfeited his roles of task and social leader by occasional inept and obtuse conduct. Like Stone and Vinson, he failed
to impose structure on the conference, to his colleagues’ regret.131
His statements of the case were reportedly unimpressive and
often incomplete.132 He imposed little discipline but allowed each
Justice to interrupt others and speak as long as he or she
wished.133 As a consequence, senior Justices often spoke multiple
times before junior Justices were able to make their initial contribution, and often little was left to be said by the time the end of
the queue was reached.134 Conferences frequently continued into
the following day.135 Burger sometimes did not record conference
votes correctly. Whether this failing was strategic or reflected
carelessness, it was not appreciated.136 Burger did not distinguish
himself as a jurist or command the respect of his colleagues.137
Other Justices rewrote a number of opinions in significant cases
129. Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor
Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 10: June 9, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding
_aids/douglas/douglas10.html) (discussing Vinson’s act in calling a special session of the
Court to review the stay of execution in Rosenberg).
130. John P. Frank, Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 212, 212–
213, 241 (1954).
131. O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 200.
132. David G. Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court 52
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1992).
133. O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 199.
134. Id.; Savage, supra n. 132, at 52 (describing Burger’s unimpressive conference performance); Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 356 (describing Burger’s case discussions as
rambling).
135. Interview by Harold Hongju Koh with Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. J., S. Ct. U.S.
(Nov. 1, 1995) (transcript available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/blackmun-public/page
.html?page=366&size=640&SERIESID=D09&FOLDERID=D0901) [hereinafter Blackmun
Interview].
136. O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 200, 202.
137. See generally Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren 257, 272, 284, 315
(Simon & Schuster 1979) (describing how Chief Justice Burger, at times, frustrated his
colleagues with his leadership style).
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he assigned himself.138 Unlike Hughes, he was not a proficient
technical lawyer, and unlike Warren, he did not identify compelling ideals to furnish a foundation for constitutional
jurisprudence. Burger often joined but rarely formed majorities in
important cases.139
Burger compounded his failings as a task leader with social
shortcomings.140 He upset some members of the Court by moving
a desk into the Court’s conference room and appropriating it as
his reception room.141 Some colleagues resented his perceived
practice of deferring initial comment and then strategically voting
with the winning side so he, rather than Douglas or Brennan,
would assign the Court’s opinion.142 His officious manner alienated Blackmun, his childhood friend.143 The disparaging portrait
of Burger in The Brethren apparently came in part from interviews with at least five of his colleagues, including many who
were ideologically closest to him.144
D. William H. Rehnquist
Just five years after the end of an almost nineteen-year
tenure, it is too early to assess fully the Rehnquist Chief Justiceship. Five of those who served with him as Associate Justices
remain on the Court,145 important papers remain closed, and the
138. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 357–358 (describing rewrites of Burger opinions
in Alexander v. Holmes Co. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1975), and Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)); Woodward & Armstrong, supra n. 137, at
315–346 (describing rewrites of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1975)).
139. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 11–12.
140. See Joan Biskupic, Sandra Day O’Connor 106 (HarperCollins 2005) (‚The truth
was that Burger’s personal style inspired rivalries.‛); Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12 (arguing that
Burger’s ‚personal characteristics‛ exacerbated divisions on the Court); see e.g. Woodward
& Armstrong, supra n. 137, at 269, 359–360 (describing instances that illustrate Burger’s
sometimes difficult leadership style).
141. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 327–328.
142. Biskupic, supra n. 140, at 106; Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 356; Woodward &
Armstrong, supra n. 137, at 100, 170–172, 258, 417–419.
143. Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun 154–160, 185–188 (Times Books
2005); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Harry A. Blackmun: The Outsider Justice 275, 287–288
(Oxford U. Press 2008).
144. David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court and The Brethren, 18 Const. Commentary
303, 304–305 (2001) (identifying Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, and probably White and
Rehnquist as those interviewed); see also Leeds, supra n. 58 (reporting Brennan’s criticisms of Burger).
145. See S. Ct. of the U.S., About the Supreme Court, Members of the Supreme Court of
the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (accessed Apr. 18,
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fate of some strands of Rehnquist Court jurisprudence still hangs
in the balance. Yet a few words are appropriate, not only because
of the length of his service (the longest since Melville Fuller died
a century ago), but because Chief Justice Roberts served as his
law clerk when Rehnquist was an Associate Justice.146
Rehnquist surely had his impact, yet it is unclear that as
Chief Justice he led the Court in crafting sustainable doctrine of
the significance of that associated with Hughes and Warren.
Moreover, the disposition of the major crisis on his watch—Bush
v. Gore147—remains controversial and the extent of his leadership
remains hidden. Accordingly, Henry Abraham’s conclusion that
Rehnquist was ‚a great [C]hief [J]ustice,‛148 seems generous and
premature. Of the seven Justices who served with him just prior
to, and who issued statements upon, his death, only Justice
O’Connor used the word ‚great‛ in assessing his service.149
Nonetheless, Rehnquist appears to have successfully led the
conference and left a mark as Chief Justice. If Rehnquist’s final
group of colleagues generally did not label him ‚great,‛ the others
all did use the words ‚fair‛ or ‚fairness‛ to describe him.150
Although Justice O’Connor said she liked Chief Justice Burger,
she described Rehnquist as a ‚terrific‛ and ‚wonderful Chief Justice.‛151 Rehnquist presided in a ‚humble fashion,‛ ‚put on no airs
at all,‛ and ‚held no grudges‛152—assessments that were not often
used in connection with Burger and accordingly draw a contrast.
She credited Rehnquist with preserving harmonious personal
relations among Justices with divergent jurisprudential
2011) (showing that the five remaining Justices are Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas).
146. S. Ct. of the U.S., About the Supreme Court, Biographies of Current Justices of the
Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (accessed Apr. 18,
2011).
147. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
148. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 277.
149. S. Ct. of the U.S., Statements from the Supreme Court Regarding the Death
of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/
viewpressreleases.aspx?FileName=pr_09-04-05b.html (accessed Apr. 19, 2011).
150. Id.; see also Sandra Day O’Connor, in In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 3, 4 (2005) (describing Rehnquist as ‚fair‛); Linda Greenhouse, Court in
Transition; William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at 80, N.Y. Times
A16 (Sept. 5, 2005) (reporting on an earlier tribute by Stevens praising Rehnquist’s impartiality in presiding).
151. Sandra Day O’Connor, Response, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1673, 1674 (2006).
152. Id.
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approaches.153 Kennedy described Rehnquist as someone who
stated his positions forcefully, but respected the ‚deliberative
process,‛ and who was ‚a brilliant, effective, and dedicated Chief
Justice.‛154 Justices who often disagreed with Rehnquist on highprofile matters, such as Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Ginsburg, were among those who praised his performance as Chief
Justice.155 That consensus signaled a professional respect for
Rehnquist’s role as a task and social leader in marked contrast
with their appraisals of his predecessor.
Rehnquist did not see conference as an occasion to change
minds, and accordingly, he conducted them efficiently without
opportunity for extended discussion. Rehnquist also deployed
opinion-writing assignments to achieve strategic objectives.
Although Rehnquist initially would seek to distribute them equally each term, he would minimize assignments during the second
half of a term to a Justice who was slow to circulate a majority or
dissenting opinion or to vote in a case in which opinions had
circulated.156 This practice, which was communicated to the other
Justices, promoted efficiency in part by giving Justices incentive
to complete their writing and to act so the Court could issue opinions expeditiously.
Just as Stone’s appreciation of Hughes signaled some of his
own values, it is possible that what Chief Justice Roberts wrote of
his predecessor may provide clues regarding his performance.
Roberts admired Rehnquist’s intellectual curiosity, his lack of
pretense, his direct manner, and his sense of whimsy, and
Roberts described him as ‚a genuinely kind, thoughtful, and
decent man.‛157 Years before his Court experienced a presidential
153. O’Connor, supra n. 1, at 5; see also Savage, supra n. 132, at 362–363 (discussing
the positive impact of Rehnquist’s interpersonal skills).
154. Anthony M. Kennedy, William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor: An Expression of Appreciation, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1663, 1664, 1667 (2006).
155. Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., A Tribute to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 58 Stan. L.
Rev. 1675, 1676 (2006); see also O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 200–201 (stating that Brennan
and Marshall praised Rehnquist as a ‚‘splendid’ [C]hief [J]ustice‛); Savage, supra n. 132,
at 14 (reporting praise of Rehnquist as Chief Justice from Brennan and Marshall); Blackmun Interview, supra n. 135 (discussing Rehnquist’s fair assignment of cases); Jeffrey
Rosen, Rehnquist the Great? The Atlantic 79, 90 (Apr. 2005) (available at http://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/04/rehnquist-the-great/3820/) (describing how
even liberals may come to view the conservative Chief Justice as successful).
156. O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 200–201.
157. John G. Roberts, Jr., In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2
(2005).
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rebuke at the State of the Union,158 Roberts spoke admiringly of
Rehnquist’s decision to skip one such occasion when it conflicted
with his painting class.159 Roberts called his former boss ‚a towering figure in American law‛ and, more pertinent to this Article,
‚one of a handful of great Chief Justices.‛160
II. THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT
Success as Chief Justice, as in other leadership positions,
depends on context as well as skill. Some background conditions
remain relatively constant. For instance, the position of Chief
Justice confers little hierarchical advantage. Unlike the President’s Cabinet, the Court adheres to ‚one person, one vote,‛
having done so long before the Court recognized that formula as a
constitutional principle.161 The Chief cannot remove other Justices
and, except for the Taft anomaly of a Chief Justice who had, as
President, appointed some of his colleagues, cannot expect loyalty
from grateful associates who owe their positions to him or her.
Yet the context also presents variable elements that shape
the historic possibilities of a Chief Justice. Chief Justices have
presided under varying circumstances that presented different
opportunities and constraints. Although history furnishes no
mechanism to test counterfactuals, circumstance surely creates
leadership opportunities and impacts outcomes and accordingly
history’s assessments. Important contextual factors include Court
composition as well as the issues that the times present.
A. The Composition of the Court
The makeup of the Court affects the context in which a Chief
Justice operates. Composition may impact a Chief Justice’s fortunes in at least three ways.

158. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. Times
A12 (Jan. 29, 2010).
159. Roberts, supra n. 157, at 2.
160. Id.
161. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (stating that ‚one person, one vote‛
is a concept that has existed since the Declaration of Independence).
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1. Ideological Balance
Chief Justices need to operate differently depending on the
ideological balance on the Court and where they fall on the relevant spectrum relative to their colleagues. Some successful Chiefs
have been centrists in the context of their Court. Taft, for
instance, occupied a center position along with Sanford and
McKenna.162 Hughes’ influence too, was enhanced by his ideological position on the Court. He and Owen Roberts occupied the
middle of a Court that often divided between Butler, McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter to the right and Holmes (or Cardozo), Brandeis, and Stone on the left.163 When Hughes and
Roberts reached the same resolution, and sometimes when they
did not, Hughes was able to dictate the outcome of many cases.164
Roberts was closest to Hughes personally and ideologically and
that double proximity enhanced Hughes’ clout.
A Chief who occupies the center position is in a strong position to lead. The Chief’s vote can decide many cases, thereby
expanding his or her bargaining strength. The Chief’s colleagues
have additional reason to curry his or her favor. Not only can the
Chief reward them through the assignment power, but he or she
also can help those with strong predilections see their preferred
outcomes prevail and perhaps see their views shape doctrine.
Whereas Taft and Hughes gained influence from their position at or near the Court’s center, Warren ultimately emerged as
the leader of the Court’s liberal wing. In that position, he operated at different times in at least three distinct contexts. During
the early years of his Chief Justiceship, he sometimes found himself as part of a minority faction, often with Black and Douglas.
Following the appointment of Brennan in 1956,165 the so-called
liberal wing grew to include four reliable Justices.166 This development enhanced Warren’s position, not only by bringing him
within a single vote of a majority in many cases, but also by add162. Ross, supra n. 28, at 20.
163. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Court That Challenged the New Deal (1930–1936),
24 Santa Clara L. Rev. 65, 89 (1984). From 1930 to 1936, the Court was, however,
unanimous eighty-five percent of the time. Id. at 98.
164. Id.
165. S. Ct. of the U.S., supra n. 145.
166. These four Justices were Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan. Stern & Wermiel,
supra n. 58, at 183.
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ing Brennan’s strategic skills to his coalition.167 This circumstance
lent greater significance to Warren’s interpersonal skills, and he
was often able to persuade Clark to join them.168 Once Arthur
Goldberg replaced Frankfurter in 1962, Warren was the leader of
a generally reliable liberal majority, which allowed him to achieve
results consistent with his philosophy.169
Like Warren, Rehnquist was the leader of an ideological faction, yet his Chief Justiceship reveals a fourth position that can
provide leadership opportunity. After Justice Clarence Thomas
joined the Court in 1992, Rehnquist found himself essentially in
the center of a five-Justice conservative block consisting of himself and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
Although Rehnquist could not keep this group together on some
issues of importance to him, like abortion or school prayer, he was
able to achieve narrow majorities in a number of federalism
cases.170 Rehnquist often wrote the majority opinion in the first
case in an area in order to produce an opinion that all five would
join before distributing the pen to others.
And yet simply being part of the Court’s majority has not
always been a measure of success for a Chief Justice. In important cases, Vinson frequently was part of a majority consisting of
himself, Reed, the three other Truman appointees (Burton, Clark,
and Minton), and often Jackson.171 Nonetheless, Vinson is not
generally credited with having constructed the coalition nor is the
resulting jurisprudence as a whole remembered as historic.172
Burger sided with the majority in many of the most significant
cases during his tenure, yet was not viewed as their architect.
167. Id.
168. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 208.
169. The Warren Court liberals consisted of Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Goldberg or Fortas, and Marshall once he replaced Clark in 1967, although Black proved less
reliable in later years. See e.g. Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation, in The Warren Court in Historical and Political Perspective 1, 7–10 (Mark Tushnet
ed., U. Press of Va. 1993) (illustrating how the appointments of White and Goldberg made
a difference in specific cases).
170. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 569, 575 (2003) (explaining that Rehnquist was
able to fashion majorities in some federalism cases but not in those dealing with certain
social issues).
171. Frank, supra n. 130, at 243.
172. See generally id. at 242–244 (noting that it is not clear whether Vinson was a
leader to his colleagues, and explaining that he was not as effective in the Chief Justice
position as he had been in others).
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2. Complementary Allies
The success of a Chief Justice may depend, in part, on the
presence of dependable allies who possess talents that complement and supplement his or her own talents. Taft, for instance,
was not a great technical lawyer but was able to rely on Van
Devanter to provide that form of professional leadership for the
Court.173 Warren benefited from the presence of Brennan, a master strategist who was able to persuade colleagues to adopt his
position and to craft opinions in a manner that would attract five
votes.174
It is not enough simply to have friends—Stanley Reed had
managed Vinson’s congressional campaigns,175 and Tom Clark
was Vinson’s colleague in Truman’s Cabinet.176 Vinson and Clark
often voted together,177 yet their friendship did not enable Vinson
to succeed as Chief Justice.178 What adds particular value are
allies who bring needed qualities to the table.
Moreover, a Chief Justice can only exploit the resources the
Court’s personnel provides if he or she fairly assesses his or her
own limitations and needs, and forms alliances with those who
can help him or her. Taft was willing to use Van Devanter or even
Brandeis to provide the technical help his Court needed.179 Warren certainly benefitted from Brennan’s talents, yet it was to
Warren’s credit that he recognized areas in which he could use
help and was willing to seek it from Brennan.180 By contrast,
Burger’s apparently inflated self-assessment may have undermined his ability to lead.181

173. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 897 (quoting Taft, who described Van Devanter as his
‚lord chancellor‛).
174. David O. Stewart, The Great Persuader, 76 ABA J. 58, 58 (Nov. 1990).
175. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 18.
176. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 190–192.
177. Frank, supra n. 130, at 245 tbl. 4.
178. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 18, 155.
179. Steamer, supra n. 1, at 176.
180. See Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 205–206 (discussing the relationship between Warren and Brennan).
181. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12.
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3. The Dispositions around the Table
The mix of personalities around the table also affects a
Chief’s ability to lead. The tasks of Stone and Vinson were surely
complicated by the presence of Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and
Jackson on the Court. They were strong-willed individuals who
approached many legal issues quite differently once the questions
relating to federal legislative power and economic substantive due
process were resolved in the late Hughes years. All were highly
intelligent, energetic, and not averse to giving voice, written and
oral, to their convictions. Their propensity to concur and dissent,
sometimes at length, consumed time that might have been spent
producing majority opinions. Moreover, Frankfurter and Douglas
were capable of real nastiness, which introduced an acrimonious
tenor to Court deliberations.182 The Court was increasingly
divided, and often the opinions reflected the personal tensions.183
Of course, Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas also served under
Hughes (and Warren) without being as disruptive, individually
and collectively, as they were under Stone and Vinson. No doubt
that reflected Hughes’ (and Warren’s) interpersonal skill. Hughes,
after all, was able to manage a Court with McReynolds and Butler, neither of whom presented easy personalities. Yet Hughes
also benefited from the fact that Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas
served their first years on his Court at a time when they were
still finding their way and had not divided ideologically or personally. Additionally, they may have showed someone of Hughes’
rare stature a degree of deference they did not accord Stone, with
whom they had served as a fellow Associate Justice.
Warren won the affection of his colleagues with the exception
of Frankfurter, who clearly irritated him.184 Although Jackson’s
death in 1954 cost the Court a gifted Justice,185 Bernard Schwartz
suggests that Jackson’s death may have eased Warren’s task
because Black and Jackson were personally antagonistic to one
182. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 35–36.
183. Id. at 39–40, 42–43, 137, 149.
184. See Anthony Lewis, Warren Says Frankfurter Degrades Court in Dissent, N.Y.
Times 1 (Apr. 25, 1961) (reporting Warren’s response in Court to Frankfurter’s statement);
see also Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 253–257, 261–264, 286 (providing examples of the animosity between Warren and Frankfurter).
185. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 205.
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another.186 Frankfurter, of course, remained to stir the pot, but he
also alienated many of his colleagues by the condescending manner in which he approached them. A more politic adversary may
have complicated Warren’s leadership task during the first part of
his service. And Frankfurter’s retirement in 1962 made the Court
more harmonious during the last half of Warren’s service.
Warren also may have been fortunate that the Court he
joined included a number of former politicians. Black, Burton, and
Minton were former senators;187 Jackson and Clark had been
Attorney General.188 They no doubt had a fair measure of professional respect for Warren. Moreover, these men were sensitive to
political considerations and, in many respects, were receptive to
Warren’s approach to constitutional issues. Some who later joined
the Court, like Brennan, Harlan, Stewart, White, and Fortas,
were also rather pragmatic people.
This discussion of Warren’s colleagues suggests another
generalization. A Chief Justice’s influence also turns on how
amenable his or her colleagues are to being persuaded. Warren
served with a number of people who were more practical than
ideological. They may have been susceptible to Warren’s reason or
charm in a way that a rival ideologue would not have been.
Taft and Hughes served among colleagues predisposed in
their favor. Taft had appointed Van Devanter, with whom he
served for sixteen years and played a considerable role in securing
an Associate Justiceship for Pierce Butler.189 Taft almost always
served with five or six other conservative Justices and accordingly
was in a position to lead the Court in a direction with which he
sympathized.190
Although Hughes experienced a somewhat rocky confirmation battle in the Senate, he joined a Court that was glad to have
him. Paul Freund pointed out that one attitude that Holmes and
Brandeis shared with Van Devanter and McReynolds was their
186. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 36.
187. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 167, 189, 195.
188. Id. at 184, 192.
189. Taft also briefly overlapped with his appointee, Mahlon Pitney. S. Ct. of the U.S.,
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
members_text.aspx (accessed Apr. 18, 2011).
190. From 1923 until 1925, in addition to Taft, the Court included Joseph McKenna,
Van Devanter, McReynolds, George Sutherland, Butler, and Edward Sanford. Id. When
McKenna retired in 1925, the more moderate Harlan Fiske Stone took his place. Id.
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pleasure in Hughes’ appointment,191 a sentiment widely shared on
the Hughes Court.
Other circumstances also gave Taft and Hughes some advantages in achieving a consensus that Vinson and Stone lacked.
Brandeis may have been a great dissenter but he felt a strong
institutional loyalty to the Court. As such, Brandeis looked for
opportunities to work with Taft, and on a number of cases, their
common efforts helped achieve Taft’s ambition to mass the Court.
Van Devanter had trouble writing,192 McReynolds was lazy,193 and
Holmes was slipping during Hughes’ service,194 all of which may
have reduced their propensity to dissent. Conversely, Stone and
Vinson had Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson in their
primes, a collection that made unity more elusive.
B. What Arises on a Chief’s Watch
What matters arise during the term of a Chief Justice will
also affect his or her opportunity to lead in a manner that history
recalls. Hughes led the Court through the crisis the Court faced
when the constitutional jurisprudence of the first third of the
twentieth century collided with the politics of the New Deal.195
The Court was no doubt fortunate that Hughes was its leader
when President Franklin Roosevelt proposed his ‚Court-packing
plan,‛196 but that crisis also contributed to Hughes’ place in history by furnishing a stage on which he could star. Hughes drafted
a ‚masterful letter‛ to Senator Burton Wheeler that refuted Roosevelt’s arguments in convincing fashion197 and generally
outmaneuvered Roosevelt.
191. Freund, supra n. 26, at 8.
192. Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891, 1944 n. 267
(1994).
193. Mason, supra n. 4, at 195, 215–217 (describing McReynolds’ aversion to work
among his deficiencies).
194. Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes 371–375
(Little Brown & Co. 1989) (referring to Holmes’ deterioration during his brief service on
Hughes’ Court).
195. See generally Cushman, supra n. 40 (describing the clash that occurred between a
conservative Court and the liberal New Deal policies).
196. See Steamer, supra n. 1, at 23 (explaining that Franklin Roosevelt planned to add
six more Justices to the Supreme Court to make a total of fifteen Justices).
197. Id.; Freund, supra n. 26, at 27–30 (citing the profound impact of Hughes’ letter in
defeating the Court-packing plan). See also McElwain, supra n. 24, at 5 (discussing the
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President Dwight Eisenhower did not put Warren on the
Court to handle the assault on ‚separate but equal,‛ but that
work, from Brown in 1954 to Loving in 1967, essentially framed
Warren’s service. Warren’s leadership in that area was certainly
not all history recalls of his tenure, which included major doctrinal shifts regarding criminal procedure,198 reapportionment,199
and privacy,200 among other areas. But it, along with these other
areas, formed a coherent record of judicial leadership that history
has largely viewed in a positive manner.
That Brown arose at the beginning of Warren’s tenure was
fortuitous in terms of his professional standing. The unanimous
opinion in Brown was rightfully seen as among Warren’s great
contributions. It established his credentials in a way that provided an early infusion of capital in his account, with history and
with his colleagues.
The timing of Brown illustrates another important point.
When matters arise may affect a Chief’s legacy. Warren may have
been fortunate that Brown arose at the very outset of his term
when leaders of the Court’s competing wings were vying for his
favor and accordingly may have been more receptive to his leadership.
Yet the accidents of timing should not be overestimated in
accounting for Hughes’ and Warren’s success. The appearance of
great cases did not propel Stone201 or Burger202 to successful stints
impact of Hughes’ statesmanlike handling of the Court-packing crisis on Hughes’ historical
standing).
198. See e.g. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491–499 (establishing rules to create a voluntary
waiver of right against self-incrimination in custodial interrogations); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that an indigent defendant in a criminal case had a
right to appointed counsel); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (holding that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be inadmissible in state-court prosecution).
199. See e.g. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575–576 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts in both houses of the state legislature had to be roughly equal in population);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that congressional districts must be roughly equal in population); Baker, 369 U.S. at 236–237 (1962) (holding that legislative
malapportionment presented a justiciable question).
200. See e.g. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the constitutional right to privacy prevented the state from prohibiting use of contraceptives by a
married couple).
201. Stone’s first terms included the Court’s path-blazing First Amendment and Commerce Clause decisions in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) (holding that members of religious minority had First Amendment right
not to participate in mandatory school flag salute), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
133 (1942) (holding that Congress could use its power under the Commerce Clause to regu-
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as Chief Justice. Yes, the reputations of Hughes and Warren
benefitted from the circumstances they were dealt, yet their presence and leadership also shaped American history and the
position of the Court.
III. DIFFERENT MODELS
These sketches of recent Chief Justices caution against associating success in that position with tangible factors in any
formulaic way. The differences among the very successful Chief
Justices far exceeded their similarities, and the qualities found in
some successful Chief Justices also appeared in some who fared
less well.
For instance, extraordinary legal skill and experience help,
but do not guarantee success, as Chief Justice. Hughes was a
great lawyer who had extensive experience at the upper echelons
of his profession.203 Yet the same might be said about Stone, who
was Attorney General and a highly regarded Associate Justice.
Warren, by contrast, had relatively modest experience as a lawyer.204 Yet Hughes and Warren succeeded whereas Stone did not.
Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist had served on the Court prior
to being named its Chief. They were familiar with the Court and
its operations. Their conduct as Chief Justice in part represented
a reaction to that of the Chief Justice under whom each had
served.205 Conversely, Warren was a neophyte regarding the
Court. But for Vinson’s unexpected death, he was destined to
late intrastate productive activities intended simply for a producers own consumption).
202. Burger fumbled leadership opportunities in early cases dealing with school desegregation like Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. at 19, and Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 U.S. at 1; and with presidential power,
like in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974), in part because his preferred disposition was at odds with that of the
majority. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 332–334, 355–358, 379–382.
203. See Ross, supra n. 28, at 10 (stating that Hughes’ persuasive gifts were such that
Cardozo, when on the New York Court of Appeals, would defer ruling for twenty-four
hours on any case Hughes had argued to ‚resist Hughes’[ ] magnetism‛).
204. Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Earl Warren: Super Chief in Action, 33 Tulsa L.J.
477, 481 (1997).
205. Lash, supra n. 120, at 313–315 (explaining that Hughes believed White was frequently unprepared for the conference and thus learned from White’s mistakes); Mason,
supra n. 116, at 787–792 (contrasting Stone’s leadership style with that of Hughes); Ross,
supra n. 28, at 220–221 (reporting that Hughes thought White failed to structure or limit
conference discussion); cf. Rosen, supra n. 155 (discussing Burger and Rehnquist’s styles of
leadership).
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become Solicitor General to prepare him for a later move to the
Court.206 When he arrived at the Court much earlier than
expected, he needed to spend time understanding the basic roles
of Court employees and observing a few conferences before he
took the helm.
Nor does prior judicial experience correlate with success as
Chief Justice. Seven of the eight Chief Justices since Taft had
prior judicial experience. Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist had
served on the Court; Taft, Vinson, Burger, and John Roberts had
been appellate court judges. Warren had not. The novice Warren
succeeded as did some, but not all, of the seasoned jurists.
Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist were gifted intellects. Warren
was not,207 although as Justice Stewart pointed out, to his credit
he did not pretend to be one.208
Nor does prior relationship with others on the Court guarantee success as Chief Justice. Taft, Hughes, and Rehnquist came to
the Court with strong relations with most of its members and
these prior relationships no doubt aided them. The same advantage did not confer success on Stone or Vinson, each of whom was
well acquainted with most of their colleagues. And Warren’s lack
of a prior relationship with his colleagues209 did not inhibit his
success as their leader.
Even running conference does not need to follow one method.
Hughes and Rehnquist apparently operated most efficiently
whereas Stone, Vinson, and Burger were less structured. Yet
Warren apparently allowed substantial discussion without loss of
control.210
Nor does success depend upon occupying a particular place in
the ideological spectrum. Taft and Hughes were centrists on their
Courts but Vinson probably was, too. Warren and Rehnquist successfully led factions at opposite wings of their Courts, but Stone
also had been a somewhat ideological jurist, yet was unsuccessful
as Chief Justice.
206. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 3.
207. See Philip B. Kurland, Earl Warren, the “Warren Court,” and the Warren Myths, 67
Mich. L. Rev. 353, 354 (1968) (‚Unlike Stone and Charles Evans Hughes before him, Warren can hardly be regarded as the intellectual or forensic superior of any of his brethren.‛).
208. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 31.
209. See Warren, supra n. 75, at 276 (reporting that he knew only Clark well, and Jackson and Douglas slightly).
210. Id. at 282–283.
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Finally, the secret of success does not reside in the manner of
seeking to establish Court majorities. Hughes avoided discussions
of cases outside of conference unless initiated by one of his colleagues. Warren, however, frequently engaged in one-on-one and
small-group discussions to good effect. His ‚persuasive powers‛
helped entice Reed and perhaps others to make the majority opinion in Brown unanimous.211 Yet whereas Warren’s efforts
enhanced his leadership, Burger apparently more often offended
his colleagues through these efforts.
Notwithstanding the absence of one precise mold from which
the successful Chief Justices are cut, less tangible attributes do
seem to be associated with successful Chief Justices. First, success requires that a Chief Justice discharge functions with
professional skill. Taft, Hughes, Warren, and Rehnquist, in different ways, met this challenge. All worked hard, came to
conference well prepared, and distributed work strategically, yet
fairly. Those who have been less successful were deficient in one
or more of those respects. Stone was not a leader; Vinson was
lazy; Burger was mediocre.
Second, interpersonal skills matter. Taft, Hughes, Warren,
and Rehnquist were successful social leaders who conducted their
relations with the other Justices in a collegial fashion. Disagreement did not make them disagreeable. A Chief Justice’s charm
cannot eliminate all strife,212 but social skills can mitigate tension
and promote collegiality. Stone and Burger were less skilled in
dealing with others. They could not draw from personal capital
with their associates, and the atmosphere surrounding their
Courts deteriorated.
Third, those who were most successful understood both the
limits and possibilities of their role as Chief Justice, taking
account of the powers their position conferred and the context in
which they operated. Taft, Hughes, and Warren understood
rather quickly that their power came from their ability to persuade, and they acted to maximize their ability to do so. A
211. Tushnet, supra n. 169, at 4; see also Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 90, 94 (describing
Warren’s sessions with Reed on Brown); Leeds, supra n. 58 (explaining, from Justice
Brennan’s point of view, how Warren was effective at persuading other Justices to vote a
particular way).
212. See Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 898–900 (discussing conflicts on the Court notwithstanding Taft’s social talents).
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successful government bureaucrat like Vinson or law-school dean
like Stone may find that being Chief Justice does not confer the
accustomed benefits a hierarchical structure affords other leaders.
Moreover, those who succeeded managed to pursue achievable goals through appropriate strategies. Warren could operate
differently after Brennan joined the Court than before;213 Goldberg’s arrival changed the equation further.214 Warren adapted to
changing circumstances. Stone, by contrast, apparently failed to
appreciate the peril to his position as Court leader of debating the
points each colleague made.
Fourth, the successful Chief Justices demonstrated awareness about themselves and the context in which they functioned.
Taft and Warren understood that they lacked some technical
skills but borrowed them from Van Devanter and Brennan
respectively. Conversely, Burger’s pretentious behavior alienated
some of his colleagues.215
Fifth, it helps if the Chief Justice really enjoys shouldering
the extra burdens that position imposes. Clearly, Taft, Hughes,
and Warren relished being Chief Justice, and that attitude probably contributed to their success. Stone’s views were ambivalent
at best. He once likened being Chief Justice to being a law-school
dean, a position he had also held, because both have ‚to do the
things that the janitor will not do.‛216 The administrative
demands weighed on him, and he viewed them as a distraction
from judging, the activity he most enjoyed.217 Burger gravitated to
his administrative and ceremonial roles regarding the judiciary
and legal profession and contributed in these respects, but one
wonders whether his preoccupation with those parts of the job
came at the expense of judging and working with his colleagues.
The common ingredient of those who found success as Chief
Justice was the ability to lead given the opportunities and confines of the position. Leadership, Robert Steamer observed, ‚is
213. See Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 205–206 (discussing the close relationship between
Warren and Brennan).
214. See id. at 446 (explaining how Goldberg became one of Warren’s strongest supporters).
215. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12.
216. Steamer, supra n. 1, at 18.
217. Mason, supra n. 116, at 581, 606, 639–640, 787–788.
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intrinsic.‛218 It requires professional and interpersonal skill,
energy, awareness—and something more.
Hughes, Warren, and Taft all brought unique stature to the
Court based on their imposing resumes. Hughes’ experience
included service as Governor of New York, Associate Justice,
Republican presidential candidate in 1916, and Secretary of
State.219 Warren had been a highly successful Governor of California and Republican vice-presidential candidate;220 Taft, an
appellate court judge, Secretary of War, and President.221
Yet their stature rested on more than the credits on their
resumes. Hughes, Paul Freund observed, exuded a ‚Jovian figure.‛222 One suspects his presence inspired a difficult bunch.
Frankfurter wrote: ‚Everybody was better because of Toscanini
Hughes, the leader of the orchestra. . . . One man is able to bring
things out of you that are there, if they’re evoked, if they’re sufficiently stimulated, sufficiently directed. Chief Justice Hughes had
that very great quality.‛223
Hughes’ professional reputation and public standing also
enhanced the Court’s stature. Jackson credited Hughes’ presence
as helping the Court weather the storm during the 1930s when it
abandoned some recent and long-standing precedents.224 Hughes
was ‚a symbol of stability as well as of progress‛ whose presence
‚gave the country a sense of steadiness.‛225
Warren brought some of these same qualities. ‚The most
important feature of Earl Warren’s [C]hief [J]usticeship,‛ legal
historian Ted White wrote, ‚was his presence. . . . He was
regarded as one of the great Chief Justices in American history
because of the intangible but undeniable impact of his presence
on the Court.‛226
Ultimately, the greatest Chief Justices are measured not
simply by their ability to lead, but by the direction and distance
they took the Court and constitutional law. Hughes outmaneu218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Steamer, supra n. 1, at 31–32.
See e.g. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 181–190, 271–281, 315–359, 411–425.
See e.g. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 1.
See e.g. Mason, supra n. 4, at 20–21, 24–33.
Freund, supra n. 26, at 13.
Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 902.
Jackson, supra n. 51, at 143.
Id.
White, supra n. 62, at 161.
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vered Roosevelt on the court-packing plan and led the Court in
doctrinal directions that accommodated the New Deal. Warren led
the Court through doctrinal revolutions regarding civil rights,
criminal procedure, and legislative apportionment. As John Hart
Ely wrote of Warren, ‚[h]e was a leader because he was a man
with a mission, and because the mission was good.‛227
IV. SPECULATING ON CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
Although it is premature to assess John Roberts’ influence as
Chief Justice, the preceding discussion offers some measures to
inform speculation on that score. Roberts certainly brings imposing assets to his position. He came to the Court after a highly
successful career as a Supreme Court advocate;228 he is perhaps
the ablest lawyer to serve as Chief Justice since Hughes. He
clearly is very bright and energetic, well versed in the work of the
Court, and curious about it. His professional record leaves no
doubt regarding his abilities to read and master an appellate
record and the relevant cases, to frame issues in a compelling
manner, to distinguish cases, to anticipate consequences of doctrinal choices, and to respond to arguments. Roberts’ formidable
talent and success as an appellate advocate makes him well
suited to lead the Court in its tasks.
Roberts also gives every appearance of possessing strong
interpersonal skills. He has a reputation for working well with
people who have differing viewpoints.229 As O’Connor wrote, ‚[f]ew
have made the transition as seamlessly and effectively as
Roberts. He knew our traditions well, as he had clerked in 1980
for then Associate Justice Rehnquist. His sense of humor and
articulate nature and calm demeanor combine to make him a very
effective Chief.‛230 Roberts does not bring the stature of a Taft,
227. John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 11, 11 (1974).
228. See Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1149, 1228–1230
(2010) (describing Roberts’ success as Supreme Court advocate); Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s
Rules, The Atlantic 104, 105 (Jan.–Feb. 2007) (available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2007/01/roberts-apos-s-rules/5559/) (describing Roberts’ success as advocate).
229. Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, The New Yorker 42, 44 (May 25, 2009)
(available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin).
230. Sandra Day O’Connor, John Roberts, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1187207,00.html#ixzz19cWN2SGn (posted Apr. 30, 2006).
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Hughes, or Warren. Yet neither did Rehnquist, who nonetheless
served successfully as Chief Justice.
Some of Roberts’ actions suggest that institutional concerns
may guide his conduct to a greater degree than that of most of his
colleagues. During the last five years, he has voted with the
majority more often than virtually all of the other Justices. As
shown below,231 in three of his five terms on the Court, he voted in
the majority as or more often than any other member of the
Court. Of course, other explanations may account for this tendency. It could reflect Roberts’ influence in shaping majorities or
suggest that he is the Court’s pivot point. Yet it seems more
plausible to believe that Roberts may sometimes join an apparent
majority either to control the opinion assignment or to foster
institutional solidarity or both, since the former may be simply a
means to achieve the latter.
ROBERTS JOINS MAJORITY OPINIONS
OT 05

OT 06

OT 07

OT 08

OT 09

RANK

1

2

1

3 (tie)

1 (tie)

PERCENTAGE

93

88.4

89.7

81

91

Not only does Roberts rarely dissent, but he writes fewer dissenting opinions than does virtually any other Justice. In part,
the paucity of his dissenting opinions may relate to the frequency
with which he is in the majority. Yet Roberts also seems to write
fewer dissents than most of the other Justices with high majority
scores. In fact, of those on the Court since Roberts became Chief
Justice, only Kennedy has written fewer dissents.232 Roberts has
never been the lone dissenter.233
231. Data in the tables at pages 754 and 755 is taken from the annual StatPack
releases at SCOTUSblog. Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, Stat Pack, http://www.scotusblog
.com/reference/stat-pack/ (accessed Apr. 3, 2011).
232. Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, Final Super StatPack OT09, 14, http://www
.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf (July 7, 2010).
233. Id. at 15. Excluding newly appointed Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Sonia Soto-
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ROBERTS’ DISSENTING OPINIONS

DISSENTING
OPINIONS
RANK

RANGE FOR
COURT

OT 05

OT 06

OT 07

OT 08

OT 09

3

3

4

5

3

7–8 (tie)

8

7–9 (tie)

7

9

3–14

1–14

4–11

3–15

3–12

Finally, Roberts also writes relatively few concurring opinions. In part, his opinion-assignment power may be a factor. He
may be able to choose authors who write majority opinions in a
manner that gives him little reason to supplement the Court’s
written record. On the other hand, Roberts may restrain himself
in order to promote institutional solidarity.
ROBERTS’ CONCURRING OPINIONS

CONCURRING
OPINIONS
RANK

RANGE FOR
COURT

OT 05

OT 06

OT 07

OT 08

OT 09

2

1

5

4

2

7–8 (tie)

9

6

6–7 (tie)

9

2–7

1–10

1–10

2–9

2–13

mayor was the only other Justice not to have filed a lone dissent, but she had only been on
the Court for one term. Id. By comparison, Stevens and Thomas had filed ten lone dissents, Souter four, Ginsburg two, and Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito one each. Id.
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Roberts has received credit in some instances in which
observers have seen his hand in crafting relatively narrow holdings that commanded a Court consensus instead of broader but
divided results.234 Such judgments must be offered tentatively
because the absence of information about the Justices’ initial
positions sometimes obscures whether Roberts forged a minimalist consensus as ‚an act of judicial statesmanship‛ or made a
‚strategic retreat.‛235 His concurring opinion in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,236 in which he defended the majority’s opinion from the charge that it reflected judicial activism in
reaching to decide an issue not necessarily before the Court and
in not according proper respect to precedent, reflects concerns
regarding the Court’s institutional standing although it might
also be seen as an effort to plant seeds for later attacks on other
doctrine.
Yet Roberts clearly has not abandoned his convictions, and in
some areas he has aggressively pursued jurisprudential goals.237
Quite clearly, he is not simply content to make the engines run
smoothly; there are some directions in which he wishes to lead
the Court. Other contributions to this symposium have explored
the substantive decisions of the Roberts Court in greater depth,
but a few snapshots may contribute to the evolving portrait of the
work of its Chief Justice.
Although other Justices have drawn their share of highprofile, controversial opinions,238 Roberts has certainly not
234. See e.g. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010) (issuing a seven-totwo decision upholding, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a federal law authorizing
civil commitment of a federal prisoner); N.W. Austin Mun. Util. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2516–2517 (2009) (authoring an eight-to-one decision resolving a voting-rights case on
technical rather than constitutional grounds).
235. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts Versus Roberts: Just How Radical is the Chief Justice? The
New Republic 17, 17–18 (Mar. 11, 2010).
236. 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
237. Rosen, supra n. 235.
238. See e.g. McDonald v. Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Alito writing a five-to-four
opinion holding that the Second Amendment limits the power of states to restrict gun
possession); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (Kennedy writing a five-to-four opinion
invalidating restrictions on corporate expenditures in political campaigns); D.C. v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Scalia writing a five-to-four opinion holding that the Second
Amendment confers an individual right to gun possession); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 130–132, 168 (2007) (Kennedy writing a five-to-four opinion upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute banning partial-birth abortion despite absence of exception to
protect health of woman).
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avoided writing contested decisions239 nor has he always written
them in a manner designed to minimize the disputed area. Perhaps the most glaring example occurred in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.240 Roberts
assigned himself the opinion for the Court although Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger241 must have signaled that
any opinion Roberts wrote would probably speak for only four
Justices on some points. Yet presumably, Roberts thought himself
best able to write an opinion that would command at least four
votes in support of a rationale adverse to virtually any racial classifications. More surprising were the arguments he used to
portray Brown as reflecting an anticlassificationist vision of the
Equal Protection Clause and his insistence that the attorneys for
the black schoolchildren shared that vision, an argument that
depended on a selective citation of sources read out of their historical context.242
In a number of important cases, Roberts has been unable to
craft an opinion that would commit five Justices to a common
rationale.243 On the other hand, consensus may have been impossible due to the ideological commitments of some Justices. In that
case, the plurality opinions may reflect the intractability of the
239. See e.g. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acctg. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3164
(2010) (writing a five-to-four opinion holding that a law unconstitutionally infringed the
President’s power by giving executive power to officials beyond the President’s control);
D.A.’s Off. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009) (writing a five-to-four opinion denying a
defendant’s constitutional right to obtain state’s DNA evidence in a postconviction proceeding); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (writing a five-to-four opinion
holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable when an unlawful search is due to isolated police negligence); Medellin v. Tex., 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (holding a treaty nonself-executing and holding that a presidential order transcended presidential power);
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–410 (2007) (writing a five-to-four opinion upholding
school officials who confiscated a pro-drug banner against a First Amendment claim). See
also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (dissenting in a five-to-four decision
striking down a regime for considering detainment of alien enemy combatants).
240. 551 U.S. at 797–798.
241. 539 U.S. 306, 343–344 (concluding that diversity was a compelling interest and
endorsing Justice Powell’s approach in Bakke).
242. Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s
Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 791, 797 (2008); Snyder, supra n. 228, at 1237.
243. See e.g. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62–63 (2008) (upholding Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol with only Justices Kennedy and Alito joining in the opinion); Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–798 (finding diversity to be a compelling interest and allowing
some consideration of race in student assignments); Fed. Election Commn. v. Wis. Right to
Life, 551 U.S. 449, 503–504 (2007) (Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas arguing for a
broader ruling overturning precedent and striking down a statute).
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challenge rather than any failure on Roberts’ part, and his willingness to undertake the assignment may be evidence of
institutional commitment.
In addition to the attributes sketched above, Roberts has at
least two other advantages that could greatly enhance his prospects of becoming a great Chief Justice. First, he is an extremely
effective and telegenic verbal communicator. His performance
during his confirmation hearings was simply awesome and
attracted widespread praise.244 Although twenty-two senators, all
Democrats, voted against Roberts’ confirmation, he attracted far
greater cross-party support, and accordingly far fewer negative
votes, than any other recent nominee.245 Roberts won support
from fifty-one percent of opposing party senators, a far better
showing than other Supreme Court nominees in the last five
years. Surely, his evident talent and his ability to project a comforting judicial disposition persuaded many Democrats to support
him, in part by making that a position their constituents would
accept or embrace.

244. See e.g. Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, Wash. Post A1 (Sept. 30, 2005) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.html) (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’
confirmation hearing was almost flawless).
245. Roberts was confirmed seventy-eight to twenty-two on September 29, 2005. U.S.
Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress—1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=1&vote=00245
(accessed Apr. 3, 2011). Alito, by comparison, was confirmed fifty-eight to forty-two on
January 31, 2006, only four months later by the same Senate. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate Roll
Call Votes 109th Congress—2nd Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call
_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2&vote=00002 (accessed Apr. 3,
2011). Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed sixty-eight to thirty-one on August 6, 2009. U.S.
Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00262
(accessed Apr. 3, 2011). Sotomayor’s nine Republican votes included four who had
announced their retirement. Id. Elena Kagan was confirmed sixty-three to thirty-seven a
year later, on August 5, 2010. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—
2nd Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm
?congress=111&session=2&vote=00229 (accessed Apr. 3, 2011).
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CONFIRMATION HEARING VOTES RECEIVED
OPPOSING PARTY
VOTES

% OF OPPOSING PARTY VOTES
RECEIVED

ROBERTS

23

51%

ALITO

4

9%

SOTOMAYOR

9

22.5%

KAGAN

5

12.5%

Roberts’ assets as a television performer coincide with technological change that may add value to those skills. Most of his
predecessors served before the advent of C-Span gave the Court
much prospect of substantial airtime.246 To date, Roberts has
maintained a relatively low profile.247 Nonetheless, in his public
appearances and interviews, Roberts presents himself as a likeable figure who communicates in an effective manner. Roberts’
skill as a public and visible communicator is an asset that can
enhance his, and the Court’s, public stature and develop support
for its jurisprudence.
Second, Roberts is likely to serve as Chief Justice for a long,
long time. Earl Warren was sixty-two years old when President
Eisenhower nominated him as Chief Justice. When Roberts
reaches sixty-two, he will have served longer than Hughes did as
Chief Justice. When Roberts reaches sixty-seven, Hughes’ age
when appointed, he will have served longer than Warren did. If
Roberts serves until the age at which Hughes (seventy-nine) or
246. See Bruce D. Collins, C-Span’s Long and Winding Road to a Still Un-Televised
Supreme Court, 106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 12, 12–13 (describing C-Span’s coverage of the Supreme Court and its members).
247. See e.g. Pew Research Ctr., The Databank, 8%—Chief Justice Thurgood Marshall?
http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1056 (accessed Apr. 3, 2011)
(reporting that twenty-eight percent could identify Roberts as Chief Justice, compared to
forty-three percent who correctly identified Rehnquist in November 1986).
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Burger (seventy-nine) retired or Rehnquist (eighty) died, he will
have essentially served longer than any Chief Justice except Marshall.248
Roberts will no doubt encounter unanticipated circumstances.
His opportunities to persuade may be limited if the Court remains
ideologically divided and, in such a context, his chance to lead
may depend on which side of the divide he is on and whether he
has colleagues who are amenable to persuasion in high-profile
cases.
Yet, his anticipated tenure provides Roberts with unique
opportunities. Like Hughes, Warren, and Rehnquist, he is likely
to experience several different Roberts Courts as different presidents replace senior colleagues, a process that has already begun.
In all likelihood, he will serve with Court configurations that will
provide a variety of leadership challenges and opportunities. The
luxury of time allows Roberts to be patient in cases in which he is
not immediately able to achieve his jurisprudential goals. For a
protracted period, Roberts will probably initiate and direct conference discussions, assign most Court opinions, and have the
opportunity to foster an environment conducive to the sort of
leadership a Chief Justice can provide. For many, he will become
the face of one branch of American government, and his image
may define the judiciary for a long time.
V. CONCLUSION
‚A Chief Justice,‛ Philip Kurland wrote, ‚despite the public
image, has little authority that is not shared by his colleagues on
the Court, except that which inheres in his personal capacities.‛249
Yet what ‚inheres in his personal capacities‛ channeled through
the few formal powers attached to his office has allowed some
248. Roger Taney, the Chief Justice with the second-longest tenure, took office only
days before his fifty-ninth birthday, and served twenty-eight-and-a-half years until he was
eighty-seven. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 80. Roberts would pass Taney in length of service in
spring 2034, a few months past his seventy-ninth birthday. Babington & Baker, supra n.
244 (noting that Roberts was fifty when he became Chief Justice in 2005). Burger retired a
few days after turning seventy-nine; Hughes did so less than three months after reaching
that milestone. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 8, 10; Pusey, supra n. 24, at 786–787. Warren retired
three months after his seventy-eighth birthday; at that age, Roberts will be about a year
short of Taney’s service. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 7, 764.
249. Kurland, supra n. 207, at 354.
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Chief Justices to lead the Court whereas others have simply held
the title.250 Speaking in 1928, Charles Evans Hughes commented
that John Marshall’s ‚preeminence was due to the fact that he
was John Marshall, not simply that he was Chief Justice; the
combination of John Marshall and the Chief Justiceship has given
us our most illustrious judicial figure.‛251 Being Charles Evans
Hughes or Earl Warren may also furnish a head start.
Although the formal powers of the Chief Justice are limited,
the manner in which they are deployed will affect the way in
which the Court operates and the manner in which history recalls
the Chief Justice. Recent history provides no single prescription
for success in the role. Each Chief Justice operates in a different
context, which will shape opportunities for leadership and the
appropriate strategies. Ultimately, the success of a Chief Justice
depends upon the manner in which he or she discharges his or
her professional responsibilities and exercises interpersonal skill,
and his or her capacity for leadership in the context presented.
John Roberts may not be John Marshall or Charles Evans
Hughes or Earl Warren. Who is? That does not mean he will not
emerge as a very consequential Chief Justice. Whether he does
will depend on his ability to marshal his professional and personal resources, to adapt to the context circumstances present,
and to deploy his formidable assets in service of a mission that
history recognizes as enhancing the rule of law.

250. Id.
251. Hughes, supra n. 12, at 58.

